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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this research is to establish the possible influence of variation in IPO offer 
price levels on underpricing.  
 
Issuers can control the IPO offer price. According to tradionalists, the offer price itself should 
not have an influence on the amount of underpricing. However, studies on IPO underpricing 
exclude issues with offer prices below a certain minimum, since including these issues would 
distort the results. Furthermore, average share prices vary substantially between geographical 
areas, or single currency areas.  
 
The main research question of this thesis is:  
 
Does variation in the absolute and relative value of the IPO offer price explain variation in 
underpricing in Europe? 
 
Research in the U.S. concentrating on the price level of offerings and underpricing seems to 
be limited to two studies. Bradley, Cooney, Dolvin & Jordan (2006) found that penny stock 
IPOs are significantly more underpriced than other IPOs, with tests suggesting that the higher 
amount of underpricing is primarily related to the low offer price. Fernando, Krishnamurthy 
& Spindt (2004) found that besides low-priced IPOs, high-priced IPOs are more underpriced 
as well. 
 
This thesis extents the research on the relationship between price levels and underpricing by 
investigating whether the results that have been found in the U.S. will hold in Europe. A 
distinction has been made between IPOs in Euros and IPOs in British Pounds, since average 
share price levels in British Pounds seem to be much lower than average share price levels in 
Euros; conversion into another currency could obscure the results.  
 
Based on a sample of 1056 IPOs in British Pounds and 510 IPOs in Euros, starting in 1992 
and 2001 respectively, separate regression analyses are performed to establish potential 
variation in underpricing for different offer price ranges.   
 
This thesis finds strong evidence that lower IPO prices in the GBP single currency union are 
related to higher underpricing, and marginal evidence that higher IPO prices in the Euro 
single currency union are related to higher underpricing.  
The results of the GBP regression equation suggest that there is a relatively strong 
relationship between underpricing and price range within the GBP single currency union, as 
the independent variable price range explains 17,1% of the variance in the dependent variable 
underpricing.  
 
The outcomes suggest that investors, on average, can make higher first-day returns when the 
invest in lower priced IPOs in the Pound single currency area, and issuers in the Pound single 
currency area will, on average, face lower underpricing when they decide to issue their stock 
at offer prices above the two lowest quintiles.  
 
Moreover, it seems fair to suggest that differences in geographical norms are the main cause 
of variation in the average offer prices between the two samples. Average offer prices in 
British pounds are significantly lower than average offer prices in Euros at the p < 0,01 level. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Research introduction 
 
This research explores differences in underpricing, or first-day return, for IPOs with varying 
offer price ranges.  
 
An Initial Public Offering (IPO) is the first offer of shares to investors, resulting in shares of 
the issuing company being quoted on a stock exchange. Academic research on IPOs over the 
last 40 years has focused on the underpricing puzzle:
1
 the fact that investors who get share 
allocation in IPOs can buy these shares, on average, well below the price at which these 
shares are subsequently trade in the stock market (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001), and the 
fact that underpricing is such a persistent phenomenon across countries with very different 
company populations, corporate control mechanisms, and institutional, legal, taxation, 
regulatory, historical, and cultural frameworks.  
Internationally there is overwhelming evidence of underpricing over the last 55 years.
2
  
 
The IPO offer price is one of the few variables that an issuing firm directly controls at the 
IPO stage. Academics - at least proponents of the Standard Finance perspective - contend that 
the choice of one price level over another is arbitrary - a neutral mutation (Fernando et al., 
2004) -, implying that the offer price level should not affect underpricing. However, the 
average offer price of initial public offerings has remained in roughly the same range since 
1933, despite the fact that the major indices have multiplied by 200 to 300 during that same 
time period (Weld, Michaely, Thaler & Benartzi, 2009). For the last 30 years, the offer price 
of IPOs in the U.S. has been fairly stable, averaging between $15 and $20 per share. 
 
The majority of studies on underpricing have been conducted in the U.S., the country in 
which the most offerings have been placed. Generally these studies have excluded issues with 
offer prices below a certain minimum: typically in the range of $5 to $8. The reason for this 
exclusion is that, in the U.S., lower stock prices are associated with small companies - 
referred to as penny stocks - and that these penny stock IPOs typically experience 
significantly more underpricing than ordinary IPOs (Bradley et al., 2006). Including these 
penny stock IPOs distorts the results of research, as research on underpricing generally gives 
equal weighting to IPOs. Fernando et al. (2004) have found that besides low-priced IPOs, 
high-priced IPOs are more underpriced as well. Both the fact that average offer prices have 
remained fairly stable, and the fact that in the U.S. both lower- and higher-priced IPOs are 
more underpriced, suggests that investors might not be indifferent to the choice of share price 
level by firms going public. 
 
Research in the U.S. concentrating on the price level of offerings and underpricing seems to 
be limited to the two studies mentioned above. The researcher could not find any research in 
Europe linking underpricing to the price level of IPOs.  
This thesis investigates whether the results that have been found in the U.S. - higher 
underpricing for both low-priced and high-priced IPOs - will hold in Europe. However, in 
                                                        
1
Two other anomalies of IPO are long-run underperformance and hot issue markets.  
2
 See table 1, p. 7. 
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Europe there are numerous currencies even after the introduction of the Euro. If the price 
level of offerings is not arbitrary, conversion into another currency could obscure the results. 
Therefore a distinction will be made between initial public offerings in British Pounds and 
initial public offerings in Euros. This research will answer the question whether absolute or 
relative values, or both, of offer prices are partial determinants of underpricing, and will try 
to validate the conclusions found by Bradley et al. (2006) and Fernando et al. (2004).  
 
In order to capture the possible relationship between underpricing and offer price level ranges  
(as well as other possible partial causes of underpricing), after a univariate analysis of the 
data a regression analysis will be conducted; this regression will elucidate the possible 
statistical significance of price level ranges and control variables on the dependent variable 
underpricing.   
 
1.2 Research questions and methodology 
 
The main research question of this thesis is:  
 
Does variation in the absolute and relative value of the IPO offer price explain variation in 
underpricing in Europe? 
 
Sub questions that should contribute to answering the main research question are: 
 
1. What is an IPO? 
2. What is IPO underpricing? 
3. Which theories explaining underpricing can be distinguished in scientific literature?  
4. What reasons are given within scientific literature for differences, or the lack thereof, 
in the absolute value of individual shares? 
5. Does IPO underpricing depend on the offer price level? 
 
Sub questions one to four will be answered based on study of academic literature, mainly 
financial economics and psychology. Sub question five and the main research question will 
be answered using a sample of 1056 IPOs in British Pounds and 510 IPOs in Euros, starting 
in 1992 and 2001 respectively. In order to answer the main research question the researcher 
will use quantitative statistical analysis techniques. The data are obtained from the 
ThomsonReuters Eikon database, an important secondary data source on IPOs; the data will 
be analysed through a cross-sectional regression analysis in SPSS. 
 
1.3 Scientific relevance 
 
Primary, explanatory research objective 
The primary, explanatory research objective of this thesis is to get a better understanding of 
the potential relationship between the variation in absolute value of the offer price IPO and 
underpricing. Based on the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), price levels should not affect 
underpricing (Fernando et al., 2004).  
Within academic literature evidence of higher underpricing for both low- and high-priced 
IPOs in the U.S. has been found. However, the potential explanations for these distortions do 
not necessarily hold in Europe. By doing this research, the goal is to add to the theoretical 
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knowledge of the causes of differences in underpricing, and to be able to generalize the 
relationship between offer price and underpricing.   
 
Secondary, practical research objective  
The researcher could not find any research in Europe linking underpricing to the price level 
of IPOs. Therefore, this thesis could contribute to better understanding of the effects of 
chosen offer price levels on levels of underpricing, and could be of aid to future issuers who 
are looking to minimize their levels of underpricing, or potentially cater to certain types of 
investors. Based on the outcome of the research it should be possible to determine whether 
issuers can, on average, influence underpricing and whether investors can, on average, make 
a better return by choosing which IPOs to invest in based on the offer price.  
 
If the outcome of the research is that there is no statistically significant difference in 
underpricing in European IPOs that can be explained by variation in absolute value of the 
offer price, the conclusion could be that certain differences exist between the U.S and various 
currency-denominated geographical areas in Europe. If the outcome of the research is that 
there is a statistically significant difference in underpricing in European IPOs that can be 
explained by variation in absolute value of the offer price, this leaves both issuers and 
investors with choices that will influence their financial positions.  
 
1.4 Thesis outline  
 
Chapter 2 will discuss the academic literature review on the subjects of IPO, IPO 
underpricing, and investor clientele, price level theory and underpricing, in order to place this 
study within its wider, theoretical context and to show how this study relates to the work that 
has already been done on the topics of IPOs and underpricing in general and variance in 
underpricing between price ranges in particular. Paragraph 2.1 will discuss IPO 
characteristics and the IPO process. The IPO underpricing puzzle will be the subject of 
paragraph 2.2, with a focus on academic theories on underpricing in subparagraph 2.2.3. 
Paragraph 2.3 will entail investor preferences and price level theory, and their relation to 
underpricing. 
 
Chapter 3 will describe the methodology used to answer the main research questions. 
Paragraph 3.2 describes the research design; selection of the data and the sample criteria will 
be the subject of paragraph 3.3. Paragraph 3.4 will entail the operationalization of the data: an 
overview of variables is followed by an explanation of the applied regression. Paragraph 3.5 
discusses potential methodological issues.  
 
Chapter 4 outlines the results of the empirical research and data analysis, and will provide an 
answer to the last sub question. Paragraph 4.2 will give an outline of the exploratory data 
analysis, followed by the regression results in paragraph 4.3.  
 
Chapter 5 is the final chapter of this thesis. Paragraph 5.1 will entail the conclusions of the 
research. The subject of paragraph 5.2 is a discussion of the methodology and the conclusions 
of the research. Lastly, suggestions for further follow-up research will be debated in 
paragraph 5.3.  
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2. Literature review IPOs, underpricing, and price levels 
 
2.1 IPO 
 
IPO is the abbreviation of "initial public offering": the first sale of shares of a private 
company to the public. This process is often referred to as "going public", resulting in the 
shares of the issuing company being quoted at one or more stock exchanges. There are 
various reasons for companies to choose to go public: the wish to raise equity capital for the 
company, and to list the company in the stock market, thereby creating the possibility for 
shareholders - founders, employees, venture capitalists and angle investors - to convert part 
of their wealth into cash at the time of the IPO or a future date in time, are often mentioned as 
important reasons (Ritter & Welch, 2002). CFOs mention the fact the creation of public 
shares facilitates the possibility to make stock-financed acquisitions, and the fact that the 
value of publicly traded stock clearly indicates the worth of the company as main reasons for 
going public (Brau & Fawcett, 2006). Going public itself can add value to the firm as 
investors, creditors, consumers and suppliers may have more faith in the company (Ritter et 
al., 2002). Furthermore, going public may lower the cost of funding for the company 
(Ljungqvist, 2004). It is however clear that most entrepreneurs would, in the absence of cash 
considerations, rather just deal with their businesses than taking on the burden of dealing with 
complex public market processes (Ritter et al., 2002). The large variation in the number of 
IPOs in time seems to suggest that valuations in the market are the main factor in the choice 
when to go public.
3
 The stage in the life cycle the company is in appears to be a further 
important factor (Ritter et al., 2002).  
 
A firm that goes public by issuing shares is referred to as the "issuer". Issuers generally seek 
the help of a syndicate of investment banks to value their company, price their shares and 
make sure that these shares are sold. These investment banks typically guarantee to sell the 
issuers' shares to investors for a certain minimum price. This process is called "underwriting".  
The underwriter syndicate of investment banks obtains a percentage of the proceeds of the 
issue, the "gross fee", but runs the risk of being unable to find enough investors who are 
willing to buy the shares at the minimum price. 
 
Based on a variety of valuation methods the underwriters estimate the firm's fair value. Using 
a unique dataset of 228 reports by French underwriters, Roosenboom (2012) found that the 
methods most used to estimate the fair value are comparable firms' multiples valuation 
methods like the price-earnings ratio, followed by the dividend discount model (DDM) and 
the discounted cash flow (DCF).  
 
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the IPO valuation and IPO pricing process: 
 
 
 
                                                        
3
 See descriptive statistics (paragraph 4.2.3).  
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Roosenboom (2011). 
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The underwriter typically assigns a weight to each valuation method used, and then 
aggregates the value estimates of the different multiples together into one value estimate. 
However, Roosenboom (2012) found that all of these multiples valuation methods used by 
underwriters are positively biased compared to the equilibrium market value: all valuation 
methods result in positive average and median prediction errors significantly different from 
zero.  
Underwriters subsequently deliberately discount their biased fair value estimate - by 18,2% 
of both the mean and the median on average (Roosenboom, 2012) - to arrive at the 
preliminary offer value, which is usually an initial filing price range in which the final offer 
price is expected to fall. The underwriter advertises the deliberate price discount in the 
underwriter report sent to investors in an attempt to capture investor demand, by stating that 
the preliminary offer price set represents a considerable discount compared to the fair value 
estimate. The underwriter subsequently recommends a strong buy advice for the stock 
(Roosenboom, 2012).  
 
After setting a preliminary offer price range the underwriters try to gather indications of 
demand, as well as information about the quality of the issue, from institutional investors. 
This new information gathered during "road shows" is used to adjust the preliminary offer 
price to arrive at the final offer price: the price at which investors can buy the issuing firm's 
shares.  
 
A final offer price below the initial filing range is perceived to be a very negative signal 
about the expected success of the IPO since it shows that there is not enough interest in the 
market for the issue even at the lower end of the preliminary offer price range; this scenario 
needs to be avoided (Lowry & Schwert, 2004). A final offer price above the initial filing 
range is perceived to be a very positive signal about the demand for the issued shares and the 
expected success of the IPO. 
This means that both issuers and underwriters have an incentive to set the initial filing range 
low relative; the filing range does not appear to be an unbiased predictor relative to final offer 
price (Lowry et al., 2004).  
 
However, often the shares are "rationed", meaning that the demand for shares is larger than 
the supply. In the U.S. the underwriter typically has the discretion of placing shares 
selectively: the underwriter will reward those investors who have truthfully revealed their 
information about the quality of the issue with an allocation of shares. Other investors that 
are left empty-handed will have to resort to the secondary market where the shares trade once 
they are listed.  
 
Since the underwriters will want to make sure that they minimize the risk of being left with 
shares that no investor wants to buy, they will be inclined to set the final offer price at a level 
that is below equilibrium price of the stock in the secondary market. If they manage to sell 
the shares at a discount, there will be more investors willing to buy the shares, and 
subsequently the price of the issued stock will go up during the first day of trading. The 
difference between the closing price of the stock after the first day of trading and the final 
offer price is called the "initial return" but is usually referred to as "underpricing". Both terms 
will be used throughout this thesis.  
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2.2 The IPO underpricing puzzle 
2.2.1 Introduction 
 
In paragraph 2.2 the underpricing puzzle and academic theories on underpricing will be 
discussed. The underpricing puzzle will be further explained in paragraph 2.2.2. Paragraph 
2.2.3 will give an outline of academic theory of IPO underpricing, followed by a brief 
description of issues related to underpricing in paragraph 2.2.4.  
 
2.2.2 Underpricing puzzle 
 
As indicated by equation (1), underpricing is formally the percentage difference between the 
closing price of the stock after the first day of trading and the final offer price: 
 
𝐼𝑅 = ((𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 1𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑦 −  𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)/𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)) ∗ 100%         (1) 
 
Underpricing is also referred to as first-day return or initial return (IR), and has been the 
subject of extensive academic research, likely due to the persistency of the underpricing over 
the last 55 years internationally. Underpricing is a persistent feature of the IPO market, and, 
while cyclical, may have increased in magnitude over time.  
 
Table 1 provides an overview of average underpricing globally as reported by Ritter (2015): 
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Table 1 
Average equally weighted first day returns internationally 
 
Country IR N Time period 
Argentina 4,2% 26 1991-2003 
Australia 21,8% 1562 1976-2011 
Austria 6,4% 103 1971-2013 
Canada 6,5% 720 1971-2013 
China 118,4% 2512 1990-2013 
Denmark 7,4% 164 1984-2011 
Finland 16,9% 168 1971-2013 
France 10,5% 697 1983-2010 
Germany 24,2% 736 1978-2011 
Greece 50,8% 373 1976-2013 
Hong Kong 15,8% 1486 1980-2013 
India 88,5% 2964 1990-2011 
Ireland 21,6% 38 1991-2013 
Italy 15,2% 312 1985-2013 
Japan 41,7% 3236 1970-2013 
Jordan 149,0% 53 1999-2008 
Korea 58,8% 1758 1980-2014 
Netherlands 10,2% 181 1982-2006 
New Zealand 18,6% 242 1979-2013 
Nigeria 13,1% 122 1989-2013 
Portugal 11,9% 32 1992-2013 
Russia 3,3% 64 1999-2013 
Saudi Arabia 239,8% 80 2003-2011 
Spain 10,3% 143 1986-2013 
Sweden 27,2% 374 1980-2011 
Switzerland 27,3% 164 1983-2013 
Taiwan 38,1% 1620 1980-2013 
United Kingdom 16,0% 4932 1959-2012 
United States 16,9% 12702 1960-2014 
 
Source: https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2015/12/Int.pdf 
(Retrieved on January 10, 2016) 
 
The underpricing phenomenon is regarded as a "puzzle" for numerous reasons. First, issuers 
in general ought to obtain the market value for the issued shares, and investors should not 
commonly be able to acquire shares well below that market value, if IPO markets were to be 
as efficient as proponents of the EMH argue (Adams, Thornton & Hall, 2008). Second, 
underpricing implies that issuers systematically "leave money on the table".
4
 The cost of 
going public for the issuer is twofold: it consists of the gross fee, the percentage fee paid to 
the underwriter over the total IPO proceeds, and the cost of underpricing. The cost of 
underpricing is referred to as money left on the table. Money left on the table averages $9.1 
million per IPO (Loughran & Ritter, 2002), an amount equal to years of operating profit for 
many firms going public. For an issuer the idea of selling shares well below the value at 
which this share subsequently trades in the market goes against common sense, but it merely 
                                                        
4 Money left on the table: the dollar value of underpricing multiplied by the number of issued shares 
(Ritter, 2015). 
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questions the traditional approach that holds that markets are efficient under all 
circumstances (Shefrin, 2007). Given the cost of going public and the amount of money left 
on the table, the question remains why issuers implicitly agree with selling their assets well 
below market value. During the period 1990-1998, the cost of underpricing to companies 
going public in the USA was more than $27 billion (Loughran et al., 2002). The fact that 
issuers rarely complain about leaving large amounts of money on the table has long puzzled 
financial economists. As Brealey & Myers (1996) state after discussing an IPO that tripled in 
value on its first day of trading: It is a rare quality to be content at selling a share for one-
third of the value it subsequently trades at in the secondary market (Loughran et al., 2002). 
 
It is surprising how casual many issuers are about trying to minimize the cost of going public: 
companies that switch underwriters for an SEO - a seasoned equity offering - don’t mention 
underpricing as a reason for that switch (Krigman, Shaw & Womack, 2001). In fact, 
switchers' IPOs were significantly less underpriced than non-switchers' IPOs. 
 
It seems that neither competition between underwriters nor competition between investors 
can result in lower underpricing. Reasons for this inability of competition to diminish 
underpricing will be discussed in the next sections.  
 
2.2.3 Academic theories on underpricing  
 
2.2.3.1 Introduction 
 
In this paragraph four main theories that try to explain underpricing will be discussed: 
subparagraph 2.2.4.2 will entail asymmetric information theories, followed by principal-agent 
models in underpricing in subparagraph 2.2.4.3 and institutional reasons on underpricing in 
subparagraph 2.2.4.4. Behavioral approaches will be discussed in subparagraph 2.2.4.5. 
 
2.2.3.2 Asymmetric information 
 
Information asymmetry deals with the study of decisions in transactions where one party has 
more or better information than the other, creating an imbalance of power in economic 
transactions. Asymmetric information theories on underpricing are based on the premise that 
the participants in the IPO process are not equally well informed about the true value of the 
issue.  
 
According to Benveniste & Spindt (1989) there are two kinds of informational frictions or 
asymmetries. First, investors are not likely to be equally well informed about factors outside 
the issuing firm. Some investors may possess superior information about the issuer's 
competitors or have private information about the quality of management or other 
characteristics of the issuing firm that the issuer can't convey in a satisfactory manner 
(Benveniste et al., 1989). Second, issuing firms are likely to be more informed about their 
own business situation than outside investors, creating a potential lemons problem (Akerlof, 
1970): issuers have an incentive to overstate their quality to potential investors (Booth & 
Smith, 1986). 
 
Regarding the first type of information asymmetry, the best-known model of asymmetrically 
informed investors is Rock's (1986) winner's curse model. Rock (1986) assumes that both the 
Underpricing: effects of variation in offer price 
 
 10 
issuer and the underwriter are absolutely uninformed about the true value of issuer's shares, 
and argues that there are two groups of investors: informed investors who know that certain 
issues are underpriced and who will want to buy the shares of these issues, and uninformed 
investors who do not know that certain issues are underpriced and others are overpriced, and 
will want to buy any issue. To stay in the game, the uninformed investors must at least break 
even. Therefore IPOs must be underprized in expectation, since informed investors will 
crowd out the uninformed investors in good issues, leaving the uninformed with a larger 
portion in bad issues. Because of this adverse selection problem, and the discretion of 
underwriters to allocate the issue to investors he chooses to, the uninformed investors must 
have a reason to stay in the game and on average make at least the risk-free rate. Uninformed 
investors do not participate in the new issue market until the price falls enough to compensate 
for the bias in allocation. In a study performed by Koh & Walter (1989) have tested the 
winner's curse model in Singapore; they found that uninformed investors just break even.  
 
Concerning the second type of information asymmetry, Grinblatt & Hwang (1989) advanced 
a signaling model in which there is a potential lemons problem: it is the issuer who has the 
informational advantage over both investors and underwriters about the present value of the 
future cash flows of its firm. Investors are not only uncertain about prospects of the firm but 
also about the variance of these prospects: the variance of future cash flows between issuing 
firms. Therefore risk-averse entrepreneurs will employ two signals: the level of underpricing 
and the "retention rate" - the amount of the firm they do not sell. The general idea behind 
signaling models is that the underpricing will make investors feel good about the issuing 
company and its prospects (Ibbotson, 1975), and that the true quality of a firm will be 
revealed before the next financing stage - with low-quality firms being unable to reap the 
benefit from the signal.  
 
There is no strong empirical evidence for these signaling models. Signaling models are based 
on a rich set of implications about the relationship between underpricing and subsequent 
equity sales that do not necessarily hold in reality: in general it is not true that the probability 
that a company returns to the market for a SEO increases the more underpriced the IPO is 
(Jenkinson et al., 2001).  
Ritter (2011) classifies theories that high quality firms would use underpricing of the IPO as a 
signal to distinguish themselves from low quality firms as "silly academic theories": 
underpricing is an extremely costly way for firms to bring across information about their 
superior quality to investors. Alternative means of communications will generally be cheaper, 
and conveying information through underpricing will only happen in extreme circumstances. 
Daniel & Titman (1995) point out that high quality firms would only resort to severe 
underpricing as a means to distinguish themselves from firms of lower quality when there are 
no other options to convey the quality of the firm. The signaling models seem to be mainly 
theoretical, with little practical use.  
 
Alternatively, information revelation models, which are also based on asymmetry of 
information, suggest that institutional investors may know more than the issuers about the 
prospects of the issuer's competitors and the economy as a whole, and the strength of the IPO 
market in general. Benveniste et al. (1989) create a model suggesting that a key function of 
the investment bank underwriting the issue is to obtain information about the relative quality 
of the issue from informed investors. However, evidently this creates an incentive for the 
informed institutional investors to withhold, and moreover to misstate positive information, 
in the hope that the underwriter will be induced to set the offer price at a lower level based on 
incomplete information (Jenkinson et al., 2001).  
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According to Benveniste et al. (1989) underpricing is the consequence of the investors' 
disclosure of their private information, in return for which they are being compensated: 
underpricing is seen as a cost of rewarding these investors for sharing their positive 
information. Acquiring information about the quality of an issue and the strength of the 
market in general is expensive for institutional investors. However, investors will disclose 
their private information when the underwriter provides them with a fair share in allocation 
of good IPOs. Sherman & Titman (2002) argue that there is an equilibrium degree of 
underpricing which compensates investors for acquiring such information. According to 
Sherman (2000) the average level of underpricing to induce information revelation is reduced 
if underwriters have the ability to allocate shares in future IPOs to these investors who 
indicate good information, thereby increasing the efficiency of the capital acquisition process.  
 
Underwriters and institutional investors deal with each other repeatedly in the IPO market, 
and the underwriter has the ability to withhold future allocation if the institutional investor 
withholds or misrepresents information. Effectively bundling IPOs across time, underwriters 
can both reduce underpricing and even induce institutional investors to accept poorly 
received IPOs from time to time (Jenkinson et al., 2001). 
 
One prediction of the Benveniste-Spindt model that can be tested is that revisions in the offer 
price range are likely to reflect investors' levels of interest and the aggregate nature of their 
information. The model suggests that underpricing should be highest for offerings that draw 
the highest level of pre-market interest: those of which the final offer price is above the initial 
filing price range. Hanley (1993) documents that the value of the final offer price relative to 
the preliminary offer price range is a good indicator of expected underpricing. Issues that 
have offer prices above the initial offer range have greater underpricing than all other IPOs, 
and for these offerings the number of shares issued is also more likely to increase than for all 
other IPOs, consistent with the Benveniste et al. (1989).  
According to Ritter (2011), the adjustment in the final offer price relative to the midpoint of 
the initial filing price range has the strongest explanatory power for the expected initial 
return. There is, on average, quite severe underpricing if the final offer price is adjusted 
upwards, whereas there is very little underpricing, on average, if the final offer price is 
adjusted downwards. 
 
In summary, empirical evidence is consistent with Rock's winner's curse model that states 
that the uninformed investors must break even to stay in the game. The value of signaling 
models in explaining why underpricing happens is limited. Empirical evidence supports the 
Benveniste-Spindt information revelation model, explaining underpricing as a reward for 
revealing private information. Still, it is only part of the underpricing puzzle.  
 
2.2.3.3 Principal-Agent models 
 
"Principal-agent problems", or "agency problems" are based on the premise that the 
incentives of the principal and the agent are not aligned. Principal-agent models of 
underpricing focus either on potential agency problems between the underwriter (the agent) 
and the issuing firm (the principal), or on that between the management of the issuing firm 
(the agent) and the issuer's owners (the principal).  
Potential agency problems between the underwriting investment bank and the issuing firm 
arise when underwriters can exercise their market power at the expense of issuing firm. This 
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market power is the consequence of an imperfectly competitive underwriter market 
(Jenkinson et al., 2001).  
 
Agency problems between underwriters and the issuing firm could arise because underwriters 
have conflicting incentives in pricing the flotation. On the one hand, underwriters should 
have an incentive to minimize underpricing because underwriting fees are typically 
proportional to gross issue proceeds, and hence, inversely related to underpricing (Jenkinson 
et al., 2001). However, underwriters might capture indirect benefits (and recoup lost fees) 
from IPO underpricing by allocating hot IPO shares that are likely to feature a large first-day 
return to clients who do a lot of business with the underwriting firm. These clients place 
trades with the underwriter's brokerage arm, paying a huge amount of commission. Through 
these commissions part of the profit that is made by investors as a consequence of being 
allocated shares is redistributed to the underwriter. This practice was especially 
commonplace in the 1990s (Shefrin, 2007).  
 
Underwriters have an incentive to recommend a lower offer price to issuers if their 
compensation is twofold - the gross spread from the issuers and commissions from investors -
than in the case where compensation is just the gross spread (Loughran & Ritter, 2004). 
Allocating discretion, which is the norm in issues in the USA, thus can lead to conflicts of 
interest.  
 
Ljungqvist (2003) shows that extremely high commissions, paid by the issuer to 
underwriters, lead to significantly lower underpricing in a large sample of IPOs in the United 
Kingdom between 1991 and 2002. Ljungqvist's (2003) findings are consistent with the 
prediction of Baron (1982) that making the bank's compensation more sensitive to the issuer's 
valuation should reduce agency conflicts and thus underpricing, suggesting that the 
incentives for underwriters are suboptimal. 
 
The other type of agency conflict, between the management of the issuer and its owners, 
arises when management of a firm that is a potential issuer extracts personal benefits at the 
expense of the owners. When executives of a firm that is planning to go public choose to hire 
a bank that has let them benefit from "spinning" - allocating underpriced IPOs to the personal 
brokerage accounts of corporate executives - these executives could implicitly or explicitly 
agree to underpricing (Shefrin, 2007). If spinning executives of firms that might issue in the 
future causes underwriters to win mandates, underpricing will be higher (Ritter, 2011). 
During the Internet bubble, allocating shares of hot IPOs to private brokerage accounts of 
issuers' executives (by investment banks) was commonplace, and it incentivized these 
executives to hire rather than avoid these investment banks known for severe underpricing 
(Loughran et al., 2004).  
Further empirical evidence on principle-agency theory seems to be rather limited, but it 
seems fair to say that especially during the Internet bubble agency problems were partial 
causes of underpricing.  
 
2.2.3.4 Institutional reasons 
 
Institutional reasons focus on litigation, or legal liability, and price stabilizing activities by 
banks after the IPO (Ljungqvist, 2004; Ritter, 2011).  
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The basic idea behind litigation theory is that companies deliberately sell their stock at a 
discount to reduce the likelihood of future lawsuits from shareholders who are disappointed 
with the post-IPO performance of their shares. These types of lawsuits are notoriously 
frequent in the United States.  
 
Lawsuits are costly to the defendants not only in direct terms, but also in terms of the 
potential damage of reputation. According to Hughes & Thakor (1992) intentional 
underpricing by issuers may diminish the risk of potential securities litigation. Underpricing 
would be considered an insurance premium (Jenkinson et al., 2001), assuming that the more 
overpriced - meaning experiencing negative initial return - an issue is, the more likely is a 
future lawsuit. Furthermore, Hughes et al. (1992) assume that the likelihood of a 
disadvantageous ruling conditional on a lawsuit being filed diminishes, just as the awarded 
damage in the event of an adverse ruling, the higher underpricing is.  
 
Empirical evidence seems unable to support the litigation theory: Numerous studies point out 
that in several countries, all of which experience underpricing, the risk of being taken to court 
is economically insignificant (Ljungqvist, 2004). Vos & Cheung (1992) found that the 
introduction of tougher legal legislation in New Zealand caused no change in average 
underpricing. Moreover, Hao (2011) found no reliable relation between underpricing and 
subsequent litigation risk for American IPOs from 1996-2005.
5
 
 
The second institutional approach is based on the practice of price support: an important 
additional service provided by underwriters in the aftermath of an IPO. Essentially, the 
investment bank syndicate will try to prevent the share price from falling, particularly to 
levels below the issue price or a little above the issue price. While temporary price 
stabilization obscures the true demand and supply conditions, it is nevertheless legal in many 
countries. There are three broad types of aftermarket support (Aggarwal, 2000): pure 
stabilization, short covering, and penalty bids. 
Aggarwal (2000) has found that contrary to what has previously been hypothesized in 
academic literature, pure stabilization does not take place; underwriters do not provide price 
support in the form of "stabilizing bids". Stimulating demand through short covering and 
restricting the supply of shares by penalizing flipping (the sale of initially allocated shares by 
investors in the immediate aftermarket) are the less transparent aftermarket activities that do 
occur. 
  
Short covering in the aftermarket can be done without disclosure, and it achieves the same 
goal as pure stabilization, but it is less risky. Underwriters can create short positions for 
themselves by selling shares to investors in excess of the original amount of the issue. The 
underwriter can choose to cover the created short position in the aftermarket by buying back 
the shorted shares or to exercise the so-called overallotment option that is part of the contract 
                                                        
5 It is however possible that there's a second order effect: in countries where legal protection of 
investors is weak, investors are less certain about realizing their required rate of return on their 
investment; a positive relationship exists between the ex ante uncertainty about the issuing firm's 
value and the level of underpricing (Engelen & Van Essen, 2010). According to Chambers & Dimson 
(2009) the level of trust between the participants in the IPO process - investors, issuers, and 
underwriters - plays a pivotal role on the dispersion of IPO underpricing levels over time in the 
United Kingdom: underpricing is mitigated by trust. 
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between the issuer and the underwriter (Aggarwal, 2000).
6
 
 
The purpose of penalty bids is to discourage flipping. These penalty bids are specified in 
almost half the contracts (Aggarwal, 2000). Penalty bids are mainly aimed at retail investors. 
Underwriters penalize investors who flip excessively, even when the IPO does not receive 
price support (Ljungqvist, Nanda & Singh, 2006).  
 
Another means to support the share price of issues is called laddering: the underwriter 
requires investors who get allocation of shares to buy double or triple the amount of shares 
they get allocated in the aftermarket. This additional buying will allow some other investors 
to flip, or will drive up the market when there are no incremental sales (Ritter, 2011).  
 
There is vast empirical evidence of underwriters providing price support: initial returns seem 
to be "censored", having almost no negative tail. Price support definitely seems to contribute 
to the existence of average underpricing.  
 
2.2.3.5 Behavioural approaches 
 
Ritter et al. (2002) argue that the astonishingly high first-day returns on IPOs during the 
Internet bubble have caused a resurgence of theoretical investigations on the topic of 
underpricing of IPOs. It is unlikely that average first-day returns of 65% could be explained 
by theories based on institutional reasons and asymmetric information; potential explanations 
need to focus on agency conflicts and the allocation of shares on the one hand, and on 
behavioral approaches on the other hand (Ritter et al., 2002).  
 
Behavioral finance is a relatively new field that seeks to combine behavioral and cognitive 
psychological theory with conventional economic and financial theory. Behavioral 
approaches are based on the idea that certain psychological phenomena obstruct market 
efficiency to a certain extent, and that these psychological phenomena explain stock market 
anomalies. Behaviorists question the idea that financial markets are fully efficient. However, 
behaviorists do not suggest that markets are generally inefficient (Shefrin, 2007). According 
to traditionalists, in an efficient market, prices correspond to intrinsic, or fundamental, value. 
However, evidence suggests that overvaluation is a motive for equity issuance: in an 
anonymous survey of CFOs of public corporations, two thirds state that the amount of 
perceived overvaluation of their stocks was an important or a very important consideration 
for issuing equity (Graham & Harvey, 2001). This evidence confirms the window of 
opportunity hypothesis of Ritter (1991) that states that firms will issue equity at opportune 
times - times when investors are provisionally overoptimistic, mainly regarding the potential 
of younger growth companies, when firms' equity might be overvalued (Ritter, 1991).
7
 
 
In the traditional framework, the assumption is that such overvaluations will be only 
temporary because rational investors will quickly spot any opportunities that arise from 
                                                        
6
 The overallotment option gives the underwriter the right to buy up to a maximum of 15% extra 
shares from the issuer. 
7 Ibbotson, Sindelar & Ritter (1988) found based on a survey of IPO investors following poor long-
run performance of IPOs that just 26% of the respondents had done any fundamental analysis 
concerning the relation between the issuing firm's the offer price and its underlying value, suggesting 
that many investors are indeed periodically overoptimistic.  
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misvaluation and begin to exploit these opportunities through risky arbitrage.
8
 Therefore, 
traditionalists in finance contend that prices quickly restore to intrinsic, or fundamental, 
value. In contrast, behaviorists contend that mispricing could become worse rather than 
better, and smart investors ought to accept this additional risk when attempting to exploit 
mispricing. Due to this additional risk, smart investors will not be able to trade as 
aggressively as they might have traded otherwise: hence smart investors will be able to 
reduce some, though not all of the mispricing (Shefrin, 2007). Limits to arbitrage amplify 
mispricing, and they could amplify underpricing.  
 
Ljungqvist et al. (2006) created a model that tries to explain that not only underpricing, but 
also the other IPO anomalies.
9
  In this model the irrational investors drive up valuations 
causing mispricing to become worse rather than better up to a point in time. It is however 
unclear when the exuberance stops. Management and regular investors know that the 
exuberant valuations will have to stop at a certain point in the future. As a consequence, 
underpricing increases as it is a way to compensate the regular investor for taking on the risk 
of the market crashing at a point close in time at which the regular investors will not be able 
to offload their shares to the sentiment investors. The model suggests that companies that go 
public in times with extreme valuations will be more underpriced.  
 
According to behaviorists, issuers are aware of the fact that the offer price still surpasses 
fundamental value, and they will capitalize on the regulars’ expected gain due to trading with 
sentiment investors. This resolves the apparent contradiction that issuers appear not to be 
very aggressive in in pricing their stock, while at the same time they shrewdly time their IPOs 
in order to take advantage of the exuberant market valuations (Ljungqvist et al., 2006).  
 
Loughran et al. (2002) propose a variation of the prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) to answer the question why issuers don't get upset by the amount of underpricing - and 
thus the money left on the table. The prospect theory presumes that the issuers will look at 
their total wealth after an IPO rather than at the wealth loss from leaving money on the table:  
the wealth gain on the retained shares caused by the price jump will outweigh the wealth loss 
caused by underpricing, resulting in a net wealth increase. In the context of going public, 
gains and losses are computed relative to the price that the executives of the issuing firm have 
anchored on: initially the midpoint of the file price range, later the offer price.  
The loss of the amount of money left on the table is framed as an opportunity cost when it 
happens in conjunction with some other gain: the increase in wealth as a consequence of a 
rising share price relative to the anchor (Shefrin, 2007).  
 
Whether caused by prospect theory or by the fact the issuers are aware of the overvaluation 
of their stock, it seems that underpricing is a feature that does not overly concern issuers. 
Furthermore, behaviorists' ideas that mispricing can become worse before it gets better go 
back at least as far as the early 17th century tulip bubble. Irrationality and overoptimism 
among certain participants in the IPO process will definitely have contributed to underpricing 
in parts of history.  
  
                                                        
8
 Subparagraph 2.2.4.2 will discuss arbitrage and its limits. 
9
 Hot issue markets and long-run underperformance. 
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2.2.4 Issues related to underpricing 
2.2.4.1 Analyst coverage 
 
Bundling analyst coverage with underwriting is a way for investment banks to attract 
business. In the U.S. every year the top three analysts (so-called all-stars) are listed for 
roughly 70 industries. For issuers these analysts are important because they can provide 
bullish coverage, resulting in higher prices at which shares can be sold at future points in 
time. Future sales could be either the sale of individual shares by insiders or the sale of shares 
through a seasoned equity offering (SEO).  
 
There are only three underwriters with all-star analysts, which creates an oligopoly structure 
of the market, resulting in little competition to diminish underpricing, as well as a lack of 
competition from new entrants (Ritter, 2011). While analyst coverage is not seen as a direct 
partial cause of underpricing, the resulting oligopoly structure of the underwriter market is 
seen as a partial cause of the persistence of underpricing. 
Liu & Ritter (2011) have found that for U.S. IPOs from 1993-2008, all-star underwriters have 
a 9% higher first-day return. Moreover, Loughran et al. (2004) found that analysts who are 
employed by banks that perform the underwriting function are more likely to be fired the 
more pessimistic their forecasts are.   
 
2.2.4.2 Short selling and limits to arbitrage 
 
Arbitrage will be effective if rational investors are able to exploit opportunities that arise 
from misvaluation by selling overvalued shares short and buying shares with equal or similar 
characteristics that are undervalued or even rightly valued, causing the mispricing to be small 
and temporary. However, short-sale restrictions limit arbitrage possibilities, causing 
pessimistic investors, if present, to be prevented from expressing their ideas.  
These short-sale restrictions are especially pervasive in IPOs. In general, brokers can and will 
only allow clients to short-sell if delivery of the borrowed shares can be guaranteed, which 
effectively rules out the first post-IPO days as share allocations are not distributed 
immediately. Regulations and market practices restrict the potential supply, and insiders are 
prevented from selling or lending their shares for some time following the IPO. Furthermore, 
the free float tends to be fairly small (Houge, Loughran, Suchanek & Yan, 2001).  
 
Gompers & Metrick (2001) found that over the sample period of 1980-1996 the market 
response of arbitrageurs to overpricing of large liquid stocks was severely limited and 
perhaps nonexistent, suggesting that the idea that overpricing of stocks could be met by short 
sales was mistaken.  
 
2.3 Reconciling theories: investor clientele, price levels, and underpricing 
 
The aforementioned sections provide different theoretical explanations for the IPO 
underpricing puzzle, but it remains an open question which of these theories holds up 
strongly in reality. There seems to be no single main theoretical cause for underpricing; it is 
more a matter of the relative importance of various models than a matter of which model is 
absolutely right. One reason can be important for certain firms at certain times, and the 
models are commonly not mutually exclusive (Ritter et al., 2002).  
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It appears that differences across investors for stocks with particular price levels can cause 
IPOs with lower offer price levels to be underpriced for different reasons than IPOs with 
higher offer price levels, as Fernando et al. (2004) point out.  
 
Specifically, Fernando et al. (2004) argue that institutional investors have a preference for 
high-priced stocks while retail investors prefer low-priced stocks (or even so-called "penny 
stocks"). Gompers et al. (2001) found that in the U.S. large institutional investors (compared 
to other types of investors) have a preference for investing in larger, more liquid stocks that 
exhibit low past returns (Gompers et al., 2001). These demand patterns were stable over the 
sample period 1980-1996.  
Consistent with Gompers et al. (2001), Alves, Nunez & Serra (2014) found that European 
institutional investors in general prefer larger and more liquid stocks that are listed in the 
main stock market indices as well.  
Fernando et al. (2004) extend these findings by showing that variation in investor preference 
for specific price levels starts as soon as companies go public: Fernando et al. (2004) have 
found that high-priced IPOs are associated with higher institutional investment, whereas low-
priced IPOs are sold primarily to individual retail investor (Fernando, Krishnamurthy & 
Spindt, 1999). 
 
Within Europe, slightly different institutional price preferences have been found: institutional 
investors that are located in countries within the Euro single currency union have a 
preference for stocks with higher prices while institutional investors that are located in 
European countries outside of the Euro single currency union, like the United Kingdom, tend 
to avoid stocks with higher prices. Moreover, institutional investors in all European countries 
overall tend to have a preference for high-priced stocks on foreign markets while preferring 
low-priced on their respective domestic markets (Alves et al, 2014).
10
  
 
The differences in preference in The U.S. - institutional investors prefer high-priced stocks 
whereas non-institutional investors choose lower-priced stocks - can have implications for 
underpricing theories. Specifically, the conventional belief is that institutional investors are 
more informed and financially sophisticated than retail investors. Hence, taken together, 
these findings could imply that theories of underpricing in which uninformed IPO investors 
must be compensated sufficiently to stay in the game a la Rock’s winner's curse (1986, see 
section 2.2.3.2) and are less likely to be hold for high-price IPOs, if it is the case that high-
price IPOs attract more informed (institutional) investors.  
 
In contrast, if uninformed investors tend to hold lower-priced IPOs, then theories suggesting 
that institutional investors must be incentivized to reveal their information about the value of 
an IPO (Sherman, 2000; Benveniste et al., 1989) are less likely to hold for low-priced IPOs 
that apparently attract less sophisticated investors. Here underpricing could theoretically 
reflect the compensation that uninformed investors receive to stay in the game as predicted 
by Rock (1986).  
 
Consistent with this idea, a number of studies show that the magnitude of underpricing may 
                                                        
10 Alves et al. (2014) express all stock prices in Euros by converting stocks traded in other currencies 
into Euros at their respective closing prices. However, they do not seem to control for the fact that 
average stock prices may vary across currency unions, and that conversion into another currency 
could obscure the results.  
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depend on the level of the offer price. Bradley et al. (2006) report that penny stock IPOs 
between 1990 and 1998 had average first-day returns of 22,4% whereas IPOs with a higher 
offer price had average first-day returns of 15,4%.
11
 After controlling for a broad range of 
issue and market characteristics Bradley et al. (2006) found that penny-stock IPOs are 
significantly more underpriced than ordinary IPOs, with the tests suggesting that higher 
initial returns for penny stocks are primarily related to their low offer price. Fernando et al. 
(2004) have found that the relationship between IPO price and underpricing is U-shaped: 
underpricing is higher for both low-priced and high-priced IPOs, and the differences across 
price levels are statistically and economically significant. Diverse preferences of retail and 
institutional investors with regard to price level appear to be the drivers: at higher price levels 
post-IPO institutional ownership tends to be higher and retail ownership tends to be lower, 
and vice versa.  
 
Conceptually, differences in preference in Europe - institutional investors within the Euro 
single currency union prefer high-priced stocks whereas institutional European investors 
outside the Euro single currency union prefer low-priced stocks (Alves et al., 2014) - could 
have different implications for underpricing theories. If institutional investors must be 
rewarded for revealing their information about the value of an IPO (Sherman, 2000; 
Benveniste et al., 1989) underpricing of higher-priced shares within the Euro single currency 
union could have the same cause as underpricing of lower-priced stocks outside the Euro 
single currency union; for instance in the GBP single currency union.  
 
A related question is why such diverse references exist in the first place, and whether 
companies use these insights to strategically set IPO prices. Companies may anticipate this 
heterogeneity in investor preferences by setting IPO prices at a level that attracts certain 
desired investors, for a variety of reasons. For instance, certain companies wish to avoid the 
monitoring role that major institutional investors are believed to adopt (Stoughton & Zechner, 
1998), perhaps to maintain certain principal-agent or governance mechanisms, and promote 
diffuse ownership (Booth & Chua, 1996). Others may attract institutions in order to enjoy 
greater stock liquidity (Krigman, Shaw & Womack, 1999; Gompers et al., 2001).
12
 That 
corporations have an incentive to consider managing nominal share price levels can also be 
witnessed from literature on stock splits. Figure 2 shows the average stocks prices of US 
stocks between 1976 and 2001 - the solid line -, as well as what the average stock prices 
would have been were it not for stock splits - the dotted line.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
11
 Penny stocks IPOs had an average three-year buy-and-hold return of -21.7%, whereas higher-priced 
IPOs had an average three-year buy-and-hold return of 44.4%. 
12 At a more aggregate level, it merely appears that companies set their IPO prices in response to 
preferences for certain price levels in the market. Baker & Wurgler (2012) found empirical support 
for the prediction that when investors place higher valuations on lower-priced firms, managers will 
maintain share prices at lower levels, and when investors place higher valuations on higher-priced 
firms, managers will cater share prices to higher levels. An interpretation of these results suggests that 
managers may be trying to categorize their firms as small firms when investors favour small firms, as 
there is a perceived correlation among investors between a firm's size and the level of its share price 
(Green & Hwang, 2009).   
Underpricing: effects of variation in offer price 
 
 19 
Figure 2 
 
 
Source: Dyl & Elliot (2006) 
 
Ever since the Great Depression of the early 1930s the average nominal share prices on the 
NYSE (New York stock exchange) have hardly changed, and IPOs have also been issued at 
average share price range that are surprisingly consistent (Weld et al., 2009). The 
announcement of stock splits that cause this relatively constant nominal price generally leads 
to a positive and significant reaction by the market, as shown by Kalay & Kronlund (2014). 
This means that not only managers but also shareholders view splits as value enhancing.
13
  
There are also behavioral theories surrounding investor preferences for specific price levels. 
Behavioral or cognitive factors could give rise to a preferred trading range. Managers 
indicate their belief that investors exhibit price preference. Fernando et al. (1999) found that 
behavioral or cognitive factors may explain why mutual fund split and why investors react to 
these splits: if their findings hold, these behavioral or cognitive factors may also be able to 
explain investors' positive reactions to common stock splits (Fernando et al., 1999). Birru & 
Wang (2014) research the psychology of share price levels; evidence suggests that investors 
overestimate the potential "room to grow" for stocks with low prices compared to stocks with 
high prices - investors suffer from a "nominal price illusion" (Birru et al., 2014). Investors 
assign greater upside potential to stocks trading at lower prices - with no accompanying 
change in beliefs regarding downside potential - even when these low prices are the 
                                                        
13
 Mutual fund prices and prices of America depositary receipts (ADRs) - securities of non-US 
companies that trade in the U.S. financial markets - are kept in certain trading ranges as well. 
Fernando et al. (1999) examine mutual fund splits, since conventional explanations for stock splits do 
not apply to mutual funds and ADRs. Fernando et al. (1999) intend to use their findings to provide a 
rational for why corporate managers are undertaking common stock splits. Positive reactions to splits 
are present not only for common stock, but also for ADR's (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1996) and 
mutual funds (Fernando et al., 1999).   
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consequence of splits
14
. Alternatively, consistent with Akerlof (2007), Weld et al. (2009) 
come to the conclusion that firms are adhering to norms when they establish their "optimal 
trading range". After having ruled out the conventional explanations for stock splits and the 
resulting lack of variation in share prices Weld et al. (2009) have turned to an explanation 
based on convention: following the norm of a perceived preferred trading range.   
 
Whatever the cause for investors preferring specific price levels, the earlier documented 
relation between price levels, ownership and IPO underpricing lays the foundations for this 
thesis. The question is whether the observed relation between U.S. IPO offer price levels and 
the magnitude of IPO underpricing, as found by Bradley et al. (2006) and Fernando et al. 
(2004), can be generalized to Europe. This question will be answered in the next chapters.  
 
2.4. Hypotheses 
 
The results found by Fernando et al. (2004) suggest that variation in IPO offer prices, or offer 
price ranges, are related to the magnitude of underpricing. This thesis tests whether the 
results found by Fernando et al. (2004) will hold for the Euro single currency union and the 
GBP single currency union. Therefore the null hypothesis is: 
 
H0: There is no association between the level of the IPO offer price and the magnitude of 
underpricing in Europe. 
 
The alternative hypothesis is: 
 
Ha: There is an association between the level of the IPO offer price and the magnitude of 
underpricing in Europe. 
  
                                                        
14 Birru et al. (2014) found that following stock splits, out of the money calls become relatively more 
expensive, while no increase in relative price is found for out of the money puts or at the money 
options; the price increase in calls is observed after the split, not after the announcement to split.  
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the methods and techniques used to test the relationship between underpricing 
and offer price levels, and other potential determinants of underpricing in the GBP single 
currency union and the Euro single currency union are discussed. In paragraph 3.2 a 
description will be given of the research design, as well as the description and validation of 
the research method; paragraph 3.3 will outline data and sample selection. Paragraph 3.4 will 
entail the operationalization of the research design.  
 
3.2 Research design 
 
The goal of this thesis is to be able to give an answer to the question: 
How does variation in absolute and relative value of the IPO offer price explain variation in 
underpricing? 
 
In order to answer the main research question the researcher will use quantitative statistical 
analysis techniques. Based on the outcome of the statistical analysis the research question can 
be answered, and it is possible to conclude whether the U.S.-based results found by Bradley 
et al. (2006) and Fernando et al. (2004) hold for European IPOs. The goal is to increase 
knowledge about underpricing. Consistent with Bradley et al. (2006) and Fernando et al. 
(2004) the data used for the quantitative research are archival data; these data will test the 
null hypothesis that states that there is no association between the magnitude of underpricing 
and the level of the IPO offer price. 
 
The data are obtained from the ThomsonReuters Eikon database, an important secondary data 
source on IPOs. The main advantage of this secondary data use is that it facilitates a large 
sample of IPOs, which benefits my research in terms of statistical power. A disadvantage of 
using secondary data is that the researcher has no real control over the quality of the data. 
The fact that ThomsonReuters specializes in information services and -products suggests that 
the data are reliable; the researcher has confidence in the data and is of the opinion that the 
margin of errors is tolerable. I consider ThomsonReuters to be a credible data source and I 
consider the data sets to be a proxy for the IPO data in both currency unions.  
 
The data will be analysed through a cross-sectional regression analysis in SPSS, as 
differences across firms are being analysed.  
 
3.3 Data collection and sample criteria selection 
 
This research will answer the question whether absolute or relative values, or both, of offer 
prices are partial determinants of underpricing.  
 
From the Eikon database an original sample of 9413 IPOs within Europe could be obtained. 
Of 2249 of these data first-day returns could be retrieved. 
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The relative value of share prices in a single-currency geographical area - a currency union - 
depends on the average share price in that currency union - whether a share price is low or 
high depends on the average share price in a currency union. Therefore the choice was made 
to answer the research question separately for IPOs in Pound sterling (GBP) and in Euros, 
since conversion of one currency into another would make the cases less relevant, less precise 
and less accurate. The first adjustment to the dataset involved eliminating all IPOs that did 
not have either the GBP or the Euro as offer currency, as a result of which 366 were omitted; 
IPOs within the current Eurozone that took place before late 2001 were omitted. The dataset 
for IPOs in GBP goes back as far as July 1992. 
 
After the removal of multiple entries (128), private placements (24), closed-end funds (76), 
and outliers – underpricing levels outside of 99% of the observations (30) and further outliers 
of more than four standard deviations away from the mean (39), which would skew the 
results and are highly likely the consequence of input failures - the final samples consist of 
1056 cases in GBP and 510 cases in Euros. 
 
3.4 Operationalization 
 
While the traditional idea holds that there is no optimal per-share stock price, or IPO price for 
that matter, significant differences have been found in underpricing for various price levels in 
the U.S. (Fernando et al., 2004). In this section I will outline independent variables that have 
been found to impact the dependent variable underpricing in previous research in the U.S. 
and that could potentially impact the level of IPO underpricing in Europe.  
 
3.4.1 Explanation of variables  
 
Underpricing (IR) 
 
Underpricing is measured as the percentage difference between the offer price at which 
investors buy shares from the issuing company and the subsequent closing price after the first 
trading day in the secondary market. Underpricing will be the dependent variable in the 
regression analysis that will be performed.  
 
The independent variable that is central to this research is the dummy variable that indicates 
price range: an IPO characteristic. The control variables can be divided into IPO 
characteristics, firm characteristics and market characteristics. Offer proceeds are IPO 
characteristics; dummy variables describing industry type, assets before the offer, and long-
term debt divided by assets are firm characteristics; dummy variables describing the year in 
which the IPO and dummy variables that indicate the country in which the issue takes place 
are market characteristics.  
 
IPO characteristics: 
 
Offer price (Price range) 
 
The main research question revolves around the possibility of the offer price ranges being a 
possible partial determinant for underpricing. The offer price range could have both a 
positive and a negative effect on underpricing (Fernando et al., 2004), which means there 
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could be a nonlinear relationship between offer price and underpricing. In both samples, all 
observed offer prices are allocated to one of five groups of equal numbers of issues, in 
ascending order of the offer price level. Hence, these quintiles represent ranges of different 
offer price levels and are coded into dummy variables. The median price range is labeled 
price range 0; the other price ranges are labeled 1,2,3, and 4 in ascending order. For example, 
for the Euro sample, the price range quintiles are: quintile 1 covers the range 0,80-5,85, 
quintile 2 covers the range 5,85-10,61, quintile 0 covers offer price range 10,61-15,70, 
quintile 3 covers range 15,70-24,65, and quintile 4 covers 24,65-136,00. 
For the GBP sample the price range quintiles are: (0,01-0,3805); (0,3805-1,13); (1,13-
1,7465); (1,7465-2,7655); (2,7655-42,00).  
 
Proceeds (Proceeds) 
 
Smaller issues tend to have greater ex ante uncertainty than larger issues, and tend to have 
greater underpricing than larger issues (Hanley, 1993). Smaller issues are more likely to be 
speculative in nature and offered by start-up firms (Fernando et al., 2004). Consistent with 
previous literature (Bradley et al., 2006; Booth, Chua Booth & Deli, 2010) the natural 
logarithm of proceeds will be used to establish a potential relationship between proceeds and 
underpricing. The natural logarithm of proceeds is a commonly used as a control variable; 
moreover it controls for the possibility that higher underpricing is associated with lower offer 
prices because lower offer prices are associated with smaller firms, and smaller firms are 
likely to place issues with lower proceeds (Bradley et al., 2006). This could create a second 
order effect. On the other hand, lower proceeds could be the result of a higher retention rate.  
 
Firm characteristics: 
 
Assets Before Offer (Assets) 
 
In the U.S. firms involved in penny-stock IPOs - $5 or less - are generally small firms 
(Bradley et al., 2006), which often face finite disclosure and reporting requirements. The ex 
ante uncertainty about the value of these firms is higher, causing underpricing to be higher 
(Engelen et al., 2010). Consistent with previous literature, the natural logarithm of assets will 
be used to establish a potential relationship between assets and underpricing. The correlation 
between the natural logarithm of proceeds and the natural logarithm of assets will be 
determined, since it is likely that the larger firms are before the offering, the higher the 
proceeds will be on average. Large companies have, on average, much higher prices than 
small companies, which could create a second order effect (Weld et al., 2009).  
 
Long-term debt/ Assets (Debt/Assets) 
 
A firm's amount of leverage is a potential sign of the amount of financial risk the firm runs. 
Ex ante uncertainty about the issuer's value is seen to increase initial returns (Ljungqvist, 
2003). Consistent with Ljungqvist (2003) leverage is interpreted as a proxy for valuation 
uncertainty. While a company’s raising of new equity capital in an IPO reduces the firm’s 
leverage, there could be a relationship between debt/assets and underpricing.  
 
Industry type (Industry) 
 
The industry type of the issuer could have an effect on the amount of underpricing. During 
the Internet bubble the average initial returns on average were high, but the dispersion of 
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returns between industries was also extremely high (Lowry & Schwert, 2002). Previous 
literature includes a tech dummy as control variable, since tech companies were generally 
associated with higher underpricing. In this research, an industry dummy will be used for all 
industries. The issuing firms will be categorized in industry groups following the 
categorization of the S&P 500; the index of the 500 largest U.S. companies measured by 
market capitalization.  
 
Market characteristics:  
 
Year (Year) 
 
Underpricing is on average higher in some years than in others: especially in economic boom 
years an increase in average underpricing has been found (Ibbotson & Jaffe, 1975).  In the 
year 2000 in the U.S. the average level of underpricing was 36%, while in the consecutive 
years the level of underpricing varied between 17% and 22% (Engelen et al., 2010). 
Therefore, in order to potentially improve the explanatory power of the regression, the year in 
which the issuer goes to the market is added. To capture potential variation in underpricing 
associated to "hot issue markets", year dummies will be included in the regression models.  
 
Country (Country) 
 
There are huge differences in average underpricing per country, as can be seen in table 1 
(Ritter, 2015). There's a plurality of potential causes for these geographical differences in 
underpricing. The country of issue thus could be a partial cause of the amount of 
underpricing. Due to potential geographical variation country dummies will be used for the 
Euro sample to capture country-specific underpricing. An issuer will be attributed to a 
country when the IPO takes place on an exchange in that country. This country does not 
necessarily have to be the domicile of the issuer's headquarters.  
 
Control variables Proceeds, Assets, and Debt/Assets were not available for all cases: I have 
chosen to use the maximum amount available per category rather than to limit the cases to 
those for which all control variables were available.   
 
In various studies the underwriter reputation, venture capitalist being part of the pre-issue 
firm, auditor quality, and R&D expenses are seen as partial causes for underpricing. 
However, this list of potential independent variables is exhaustive. Because of limitations in 
the data covered by Thomson Reuters Eikon, the independent variables mentioned in this 
subparagraph are central to the regression models that I will outline in subparagraph 3.4.2. 
3.4.2 Regression 
 
A general version of the model I estimate using ordinary least squares regression takes the 
following form:  
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛,𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1
 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝐽
𝑗−1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
There are two ways to perform the regression: either starting with the dependent and the 
independent variable and adding the control variables or starting with the dependent and the 
control variables and adding the independent variables. The latter will show the incremental 
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explanatory power of the independent variable whereas the former will show the explanatory 
power of the independent variable on its own.  
The choice was made to perform both regression methods, since that highlights the 
differences in outcome and the conclusions that can be drawn from the regression. 
Furthermore performing both regression methods will assist in providing an answer to the 
research questions.  
Using SPSS, I will commence with the former: a regression of the dependent variable 
underpricing and the independent dummy variable price range. The price level range 
dummies, n, will each have Beta coefficients. The control variables will be added to the 
initial regression analysis to establish a potential improvement in the adjusted fit of the 
model. The results of the latter method will be shown afterwards.  
 
Both methods are consistent with earlier research by Bradley et al. (2006) and Fernando et al. 
(2004): Bradley et al. (2006) start with a penny stock dummy and add control variables, 
before dropping all IPOs above $10 to establish whether low-priced IPOs are simply more 
underpriced than high-priced IPOs regardless of the penny stock status. Fernando et al. 
(2004) start their regression with filing price and the square of filing price as independent 
variables, then regress the dependent variable underpricing against the control variables 
before regressing against all independent variables available. In both studies the number of 
observations (N) decreases as more variables are added.  
 
3.5 Methodological issues 
 
In order to be able generalize the findings of the regression model outside the samples used, 
the underlying assumptions must be met.  
The data have been checked for the assumption of linearity, (multi-) collinearity, 
autocorrelation, homoscedasticity and normal distribution of errors. Linearity concerns the 
extent to which the dependent variable is linearly related to one or more predictors, or 
independent variables. Collinearity concerns the degree to which two or more predictors are 
correlated to each other: independent variables should not correlate too highly. 
Autocorrelation, homoscedasticity and normal distribution of errors concern the residual 
terms. Autocorrelation concerns the extent to which the residual terms for any two 
observations are independent, or uncorrelated. Homoscedasticity concerns the degree to 
which the residuals of the dependent and the independent variables have the same variance. 
Normal distribution of residuals in the model concerns the assumption that the residuals are 
random, normally distributed variables with 0 mean. All assumptions were satisfied.
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
15 See the appendix for the results of the assumption checks. 
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4. Descriptive statistics and empirical research results 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the results of the research described in chapter 3 will be presented and 
discussed. Paragraph 4.2 will commence with the more general exploratory data analysis of 
the sample; the focus will be on descriptive statistics at the country level, industry level and 
year level, followed by the presentation of the regression results in paragraph 4.3. 
 
4.2 Exploratory data analysis 
 
4.2.1 Sample Characteristics 
 
The results of the descriptive statistics for both samples - the Euro sample and the GBP 
sample - are presented in this section. Descriptive statistics enable the variables to be   
described and compared numerically, focusing on the central tendency and the dispersion of 
the data set. The central tendency provides some general impression of values in the sample; 
in this thesis the mean is used as way of measuring central tendency. Standard deviation 
describes the extent to which the data values in the sample are dispersed around, or differ 
from, the mean. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 show the main characteristics of the two samples. 
 
Table 2 
Characteristics of the Euro dataset 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev N t-value 
Underpricing (%) 5,142 12,347 510 9,405** 
Offer price 17,029 15,883 510  
Proceeds 242,267 543,463 510  
Total assets 3691,215 20890,675 413  
Total debt 1327,057 8207,192 249  
**. t-tests is significant at the 0,01 level (two-tailed). 
 
 
Table 3 
Characteristics of the GBP dataset 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev N t-value 
Underpricing (%) 11,386 13,218 1056 27,992** 
Offer price 2,060 2,839 1056  
Proceeds 134,838 430,095 1056  
Total assets 1445,693 13364,031 609  
Total debt 318,305 1665,979 267  
**. t-tests is significant at the 0,01 level (two-tailed). 
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Underpricing is significantly different from zero in both currency unions at the 0,01 level. 
The result of Welch's t-test, comparing the two samples, is that underpricing is significantly 
higher in the GBP sample than in the Euro sample at the 0,01 level - the t-value for the Welch 
test is 9,163.  
 
The mean offer price in the GBP currency union is far lower than the mean offer price in the 
Euro currency union; the GBP/Euro exchange rate has not surpassed 1,5 over the last 10 
years. Given an exchange rate of 1,5 the t-value for the Welch test comparing the average 
offer prices of both samples is 19,484; this suggest that the average offer prices within the 
Euro single currency union are significantly higher than the average offer prices in the GBP 
single currency union at the 0,01 level.  
 
The correlation coefficient enables the quantification of the strength of the linear relationship 
between two numerical variables. Correlation implies only a relationship rather than a cause-
and effect relationship.  
Tables 4 and 5 assess the strength of the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
control variables that are not dummy variables. The probability of the correlation coefficient 
having occurred by chance alone is calculated using SPSS. Correlation is considered 
statistically significant at the p < 0,01 level if the likelihood of any difference between 
variables occurring by chance has a probability of less than 0,01. Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient assumes that the sample is selected at random and that the data are ranked 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2016).  
 
 
Table 4 
Spearman's rank correlations between variables in Euro sample 
 
Variable IR Offer price LN Proceeds LN Assets Debt/Assets 
IR 1,000     
Offer price -0,065 1,000    
LN Proceeds -0,052 0,328** 1,000   
LN Assets -0,036 0,371** 0,700** 1,000  
Debt/Assets -0,047 0,088 0,276** 0,424** 1,000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0,01 level. 
 
 
Table 5 
Spearman's rank correlations between variables in GBP sample 
 
Variable IR Offer price LN Proceeds LN Assets Debt/Assets 
IR 1,000     
Offer price -0,379** 1,000    
LN Proceeds -0,352** 0,719** 1,000   
LN Assets -0,199** 0,664** 0,766** 1,000  
Debt/Assets -0,092 0,085 0,163** 0,223** 1,000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0,01 level. 
 
The most striking outcome is the difference in correlation between the dependent variable 
underpricing (IR) and the offer price, proceeds and assets in the GBP currency union 
compared to the Euro currency union.  
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4.2.2 Countries 
 
Average underpricing varies globally to great extent.
16
 Average underpricing is significantly 
higher in the GBP-currency union than in the Euro-currency union.
17
 Tables 6 and 7 show the 
variation in underpricing between countries within these currency unions. 
 
Table 6 
Underpricing per country in Euro currency union 
 
Country Mean Std Dev N 
Austria 7,776 12,051 13 
Belgium 8,020 8,389 41 
Finland 3,170 13,117 11 
France 4,045 12,018 214 
Germany 5,823 12,857 79 
Greece 5,308 21,206 27 
Italy 7,640 14,103 49 
Luxembourg 3,273 8,935 7 
Netherlands 4,490 7,594 17 
Ireland 8,794 7,289 12 
Spain 4,275 8,361 13 
United Kingdom 2,244 8,115 19 
 
 
Table 7 
Underpricing per country in GBP currency union 
 
Country Mean Std Dev N 
Ireland 12,915 13,327 15 
United Kingdom 11,457 13,348 1006 
 
The data show that underpricing varies between countries. Average underpricing in the Euro 
sample is lower for all countries than average underpricing in the GBP sample; the minimum 
of numbers of IPOs per country has been set at seven, based on research experience.  
 
4.2.3 Industry 
 
The IPOs in the samples used in this thesis have been subdivided by industry based on the 
subindices of the S&P 500. Most studies, especially U.S. studies, agree that the tech industry 
is associated with the highest average underpricing (Loughran et al., 2004; Lowry et al., 
2004), especially during the Internet bubble. Table 8 and 9 show the average underpricing per 
industry. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
16
 See table 1, p. 7.  
17
 See tables 2 and 3, p. 26. 
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Table 8 
Underpricing per industry in the Euro currency union 
 
Industry Mean Std Dev N 
Consumer discret. 7,923 12,310 69 
Consumer staples 7,558 16,339 31 
Energy 6,509 9,038 12 
Financials 4,482 12,385 46 
Health Care 4,014 10,495 76 
Industrials 5,552 13,637 109 
Materials 5,850 8,782 25 
Real Estate 1,912 7,963 34 
Technology 4,648 13,125 93 
Utilities 0,226 9,365 15 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Underpricing per industry in the GBP currency union 
 
Industry Mean Std Dev N 
Consumer discret. 11,052 12,245 121 
Consumer staples 9,361 11,997 46 
Energy 11,911 15,376 64 
Financials 10,150 13,348 256 
Health Care 11,379 12,753 77 
Industrials 11,916 12,420 173 
Materials 13,694 12,991 107 
Real Estate 7,871 8,200 42 
Technology 12,756 14,151 158 
Utilities 12,181 13,675 12 
 
 
The difference in average underpricing between the technology sector and the other 
industries can't be found in this research. Average underpricing in Euros rather than in GBP 
is lower for all sectors.  
4.2.4 Year and price 
 
Several studies mention that the variety in the number of IPOs is related to economic 
multiples, which are deemed to be higher during economically bullish periods - contrary to 
the idea by traditionalists that management should not try to time the market. Booth et al. 
(2010) use the amount of IPOs that takes place 30 calendar days before the IPO date as a 
proxy of economic sentiment; Bradley et al. (2006) use year dummies as a proxy of economic 
sentiment. In this research year dummies will be used as well. Lowry et al. (2002) found that 
high IPO first-day returns lead high IPO activity by about six months. Kumar (2009) found 
that during economically bearish periods investors prefer stocks with lottery-like features, 
suggesting that in bearish periods investors prefer lower-priced stocks. This seems consistent 
with the fact that within the period 1999-2000, during the highs of the Internet bubble, only 
three penny stock IPOs - IPOs of $5 or less - were placed in the U.S. (Bradley et al., 2006). 
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Table 10 and 11 show the influence of the economic cycle for average underpricing, average 
price, and the number of IPOs.  
 
Table 10 
Underpricing per year in the Euro currency union 
 
Year Mean IR Mean price N 
2001 -1,896 3,53 2 
2002 -1,088 5,84 10 
2003 11,266 9,14 13 
2004 3,827 17,36 40 
2005 3,760 19,90 46 
2006 5,988 19,43 124 
2007 6,293 17,05 125 
2008 6,587 11,05 16 
2009 7,277 12,44 8 
2010 -2,449 12,73 14 
2011 6,929 17,34 21 
2012 4,206 14,10 14 
2013 6,210 20,62 18 
2014 1,184 17,16 38 
2015 5,766 14,76 21 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Underpricing per year in the GBP currency union 
 
Year Mean IR Mean price N 
2001 12,321 0,87 19 
2002 3,759 1,23 25 
2003 12,321 1,33 56 
2004 16,632 1,47 187 
2005 14,000 1,90 152 
2006 11,505 1,99 157 
2007 10,416 2,67 115 
2008 10,042 3,30 22 
2009 5,954 1,21 5 
2010 6,655 3,26 39 
2011 12,091 2,25 37 
2012 10,033 1,30 28 
2013 10,572 2,16 62 
2014 7,872 2,75 89 
2015 9,550 2.57 35 
 
In both samples the number of issues fell quite severe in 2008 and 2009, after which the 
amount gradually increased, although the levels are still not near where they were in 2006 
and 2007.  
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The global financial crisis started in the second half of 2007 and the major stock indices 
bottomed in the first quarter of 2009.  
The average IPO price dropped as well in the Euro sample, whereas in the GBP sample there 
is no real clear pattern: the year with the highest average IPO price was 2008. On the other 
hand, the year with the second lowest average IPO price was 2009.  
 
In the next paragraph the outcome of the regression analysis will be presented.   
 
4.3 Regression results 
 
The choice was made to perform two regression methods as described in subparagraph 3.4.2, 
highlighting the differences in outcome and the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
regression. Performing both regression methods will assist in providing an answer to the 
research questions.  
 
The regression results for the Euro sample will be given in tables 12 and 13; the regression 
results for the GBP sample will be given in tables 14 and 15.  
 
Table 12 
Regression results for underpricing in the Euro currency union 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Constant  3,920*** 5,170*** 5,982*** 4,615* 6,120* 
 (3,232) (3,684) (2,532) (1,937) (1,933) 
Price range 1 1,582 1,604 0,432 1,402 1,502 
 (0,906) (0,921) (0,210) (0,589) (0,411) 
Price range 2 2,275 2,082 0,779 0,197 1,432 
 (1,323) (1,211) (0,425) (0,098) (0,497) 
Price range 3 0,720 1,109 0,633 1,801 3,688 
 (0,419) (0,641) (0,350) (0,924) (1,302) 
Price range 4 1,565 2,319 2,795 4,192** 5,824** 
 (0,910) (1,311) (1,470) (2,039) (2,044) 
      
LN Proceeds  -0,408* -0,638** -0,617 -1,043 
  (-1,761) (-2,186) (-1,247) (-1,417) 
LN Assets    0,022 -0,278 
    (0,053) (-0,432) 
Debt/Assets     -0,007 
     (-0,132) 
      
Industry dummies N N Y Y Y 
Country dummies N N Y Y Y 
Year dummies N N Y Y Y 
      
Adj. R² -0,004 0,000 0,009 -0,007 0,008 
Observations (N) 510 510 510 413 249 
Note * indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level. 
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The regression coefficients that are given for the independent variables and the control 
variables are the unstandardized coefficients. The unstandardized coefficients denote the 
change in the dependent variable when a unit of measurement of the independent or control 
variable is added. Below the coefficients, between brackets, the t-values of the individual 
regression coefficients are given. The t-value indicates the probability of the results occurring 
by chance: * indicates that the probability of the results occurring by chance is less than 10%, 
** indicates that the probability of the results occurring by chance is less than 5%, and *** 
indicates that the probability of the results occurring by chance is less than 1%. For the 
dummy variables the N and the Y indicate whether these dummies are part of the regression: 
N means no, Y means yes.  
 
The regression coefficient for the control variable LN Proceeds is negative statistically 
significant at the p < 0,10 level in model 2. The regression coefficient for the control variable 
LN Proceeds is negative and statistically significant at the p < 0,05 level in model 3, after the 
dummy variables were added to the regression. Hence, the greater the proceeds the smaller 
underpricing on average is, in line with Hanley (1993). 
 
As for variables that are central to this study, the regression coefficient for the independent 
variable Price range 4 is statistically significant at the p < 0,05 level in models 4 and 5, but 
not in models 1, 2, and 3. Thus, according to models 4 and 5, firms that have offer prices 
belonging to quintile 4 have, on average, a significantly higher underpricing compared to 
firms that belong to quintile 0 (median range of offer prices). The higher underpricing is in 
the range of 4,19 to 5,82 percent. For firms in other offer price quintiles, I do not find 
evidence that underpricing is significantly different from the sample of median-priced firms, 
since the coefficients on the dummy variables Price range 1, 2 and 3 are not statistically 
significant at the conventional levels of significance. 
However, models 4 and 5 have a different number of observations (N) than models 1, 2, and 
3 due to the unavailability of data of the control variables LN Assets and Debt/Assets in 
ThomsonReuters Eikon. This means that the samples in models 4 and 5 are both different 
from each other and different from the samples of the models 1, 2, and 3.  
 
R² indicates the degree of goodness of fit of the estimated multiple regression equation; it 
represents the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that can be explained by 
the multiple regression equation. The Adj. R² helps to avoid overestimating the impact of 
adding an independent variable on the amount of variance explained by the estimated 
regression equation. The Adj. R²'s of models 1 to 5 indicate that there is a low or even 
negative degree of goodness of fit of the regression model, meaning that virtually none of the 
variance in the dependent variable underpricing can be explained by the regression model 
(the independent variables price range and the control variables). 
 
The low regression adjusted R² found in the models in table 12 are in line with earlier studies 
and indicate that stock returns are generally difficult to explain by means of common firm-
level variables. Fernando et al. (2004) found an adjusted R² of 3,3% in their initial model that 
is similar to model 1. Bradley et al. (2006) found an adjusted R² of 0,55% in their initial 
model that regresses underpricing against a penny stock dummy.  
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Table 13 
Regression results for underpricing in the Euro currency union 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Constant  6,074*** 5,982*** 
 (3,614) (2,532)  
Price range 1  0,432 
  (0,210) 
Price range 2  0,779 
  (0,425) 
Price range 3  0,633 
  (0,350) 
Price range 4  2,795 
  (1,470) 
   
LN Proceeds -0,502* -0,638** 
 (-1,903) (-2,186) 
   
Industry dummies Y Y 
Country dummies Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y 
   
Adj. R² 0,012 0,009 
Observations (N) 510 510 
Note * indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level 
 
Table 13 shows the results model 1, which consists of the available control variables for the 
whole Euro data set, and model 2, in which the independent variable price range for all 
observations are added.  
 
Model 2 in table 13 is the same as model 3 in table 12. The addition of the independent 
variable allows for making a statement about the incremental explanatory power of the 
independent variable price range for all observations, measured by the difference in Adj. R² 
between models 1 and 2. In this case the incremental explanatory power is negative. 
 
In model 1 the regression coefficient for the control variable LN Proceeds is negative and 
statistically significant at the p < 0,10 level. 
 
In conclusion, for my research question the results of tables 12 and 13 suggest that - 
measured by Adj. R² - no robust relationship can be found between the variation in absolute 
value of the offer price and underpricing within the Euro currency union, and that the 
addition of price range dummies to the existing model causes no improvement in the 
explanatory power: the degree of goodness of fit of the regression model decreases after 
adding the price ranges.  
However, there is some marginal evidence that higher offer price ranges are associated with 
higher underpricing.  
 
In the next two tables the regression results for the GBP sample will be given. 
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Table 14 
Regression results for underpricing in the GBP currency union 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Constant  7,455*** 9,797*** 11,664*** 10,862*** 14,270*** 
 (9,125) (7,998) (6,871) (5,369) (5,039) 
Price range 1 14,325*** 12,744*** 12,118*** 10,631*** 12,096*** 
 (11,980) (9,491) (8,729) (5,813) (4,117) 
Price range 2 6,598*** 5,551*** 4,806*** 1,985 -0,559 
 (5,678) (4,516) (3,812) (1,231) (-0,215) 
Price range 3 0,769 0,882 -0,117 -0,555 -3,494 
 (0,667) (0,767) (-0,098) (-0,349) (-1,451) 
Price range 4 -0,630 0,421 -0,072 -2,236 -3,171 
 (-0,546) (0,344) (-0,056) (-1,311) (-1,289) 
      
LN Proceeds  -0,665*** -0,631** -0,224 -0,356 
  (-2,561) (-2,259) (-0,520) (-0,480) 
LN Assets    0,191 0,186 
    (0,606) (0,732) 
Debt/Assets     -0,037 
     (-1,122) 
      
Industry dummies N N Y Y Y 
Year dummies N N Y Y Y 
      
Adj. R² 0,171 0,175 0,189 0,137 0,156 
Observations (N) 1056 1056 1056 609 267 
Note * indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level 
 
Table 14 shows the results for the GBP currency union, and the models are similar to the 
models in table 12 (apart from country dummies). Contrary to the results found in the Euro 
data set, as for variables that are central to this study, in all models in table 14 the regression 
coefficient for the independent variable Price range 1 is statistically significant at the p < 0,01 
level. Moreover, in models 1, 2, and 3 the regression coefficient for the independent variable 
Price range 2 is statistically significant at the p < 0,01 level. Thus, according to all models, 
firms that have offer prices belonging to quintile 1 have, on average, a significantly higher 
underpricing compared to firms that belong to quintile 0 (median range of offer prices), and 
according to models 1, 2, and 3, firms that have offer prices belonging to quintile 2 have, on 
average, a significantly higher underpricing compared to firms that belong to quintile 0. The 
higher underpricing in quintile 1 is in the range of 10,63 to 14,32 percent; the higher 
underpricing in quintile 2 is in the range of 4,81 to 6,60 percent. For firms in other offer price 
quintiles, I do not find evidence that underpricing is significantly different from the sample of 
median-priced firms, since the coefficients on the dummy variables Price range 3 and 4 are 
not statistically significant at the conventional levels of significance. The results found are 
consistent with Bradley et al. (2006).  
 
In model 2 the regression coefficient for the control variable LN Proceeds is negative and 
statistically significant at the p < 0,01 level; in model 3 the regression coefficient for the 
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control variable LN Proceeds is negative and statistically significant at the p < 0,05 level, 
consistent with Hanley (1993).  
 
The Adj. R² of model 1 is 0,171, meaning that 17,1% of the variance in the dependent 
variable underpricing can be explained by the regression model. The degree of goodness of 
fit of the estimated multiple regression equation - measured by Adj. R² - improves to 0,175 
percent when the control variable LN Proceeds is added to the regression, and the 0,189 
percent when the industry and year dummies are added to the regression. Addition of the 
control variables LN assets and debt/assets reduces the degree of goodness of fit.  
 
Models 4 and 5 have a different number of observations than models 1, 2, and 3 due to the 
unavailability of data of the control variables LN Assets and Debt/Assets in ThomsonReuters 
Eikon. This means that the samples in models 4 and 5 are both different from each other and 
different from the samples of the models 1, 2, and 3.
18
  
 
The regression adjusted R-squares found in are much higher than the results of Fernando et 
al. (2004) who found an adjusted R² of 3,3% and Bradley et al. (2006) who found an adjusted 
R² of 0,55%.  
 
Table 15 
Regression results for underpricing in the GBP currency union 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Constant  20,005*** 11,664*** 
 (14,733) (6,871) 
Price range 1  12,118*** 
  (8,729) 
Price range 2  4,806*** 
  (3,812) 
Price range 3  -0,117 
  (-0,098) 
Price range 4  -0,072 
  (-0,056) 
   
LN Proceeds -2,132*** -0,631** 
 (-10,120) (-2.259) 
   
Industry dummies Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y 
   
Adj. R² 0,118 0,189 
Observations (N) 1056 1056 
Note * indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level 
 
                                                        
18 While not statistically significant at the conventional levels of significance, Price range 2 is 
negative in model 5. This could be due to difference in sample size.  
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Table 15 shows the incremental power of the price ranges, similar to table 13. Model 1 
consists of the available control variables for the whole GBP data set. 
The regression coefficient for the control variable LN Proceeds is statistically significant at 
the p < 0,01 level in model 1.  
 
Model 2 in table 15 is the same as model 3 in table 14.  
In order to be able to make a statement about the incremental explanatory power of the 
independent variable price range for all observations, the independent variable price range is 
added to model 1. In this case the incremental explanatory power, measured by the difference 
in Adj. R² between models 1 and 2 is 0,071: adding the price ranges to the regression 
improves the explanatory power of the model by 7,1%.  Independent variables price range 1 
and price range 2 are statistically significant at the p < 0,01 level.  
 
For my research question this means that a relationship can be found between the variation in 
absolute value of the offer price and underpricing within the GBP currency union, and that 
the addition of price range dummies to the existing model causes an improvement in the 
explanatory power: The degree of goodness of fit of the regression model - measured by Adj. 
R² - increases by 7,1%. 
 
In conclusion, for my research question the results of tables 14 and 15 suggest that - 
measured by Adj. R² - a relationship can be found between the variation in absolute value of 
the offer price and underpricing within the GBP currency union. In model 3 of table 14, 
18,9% of the variance in the dependent variable underpricing can be explained by the 
independent variables price range and the control variables, whereas 17,1% of the variance in 
the dependent variable underpricing in model 1 of table 14 can be explained by the 
independent variable price range alone.  
Moreover, the addition of price range dummies to the existing model 1 in table 15 causes an 
improvement in the explanatory power: the degree of goodness of fit of the regression model 
- measured by Adj. R² - increases by 7,1%. 
 
Furthermore, in all models in table 14 the regression coefficient for the independent variable 
price range 1 is statistically significant at the p < 0,01 level, and in models 1, 2, and 3 the 
regression coefficient for the independent variable price range 2 is statistically significant at 
the p < 0,01 level, which suggests that lower price ranges are associated with higher 
underpricing. 
 
In summary, the U-shaped relation that was found by Fernando et al. (2004) cannot be found 
either for the Euro single currency union or for the GBP single currency union, although 
price seems to be relevant: there is marginal evidence that higher price ranges within the Euro 
currency union are associated with higher underpricing, and there is strong evidence that 
lower price ranges within the GBP currency union are associated with higher underpricing. 
The results found for the GBP single currency union are consistent with Bradley et al. (2006).  
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5. Conclusions, discussion, and recommendations 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
This research has tried to establish new insight into the underpricing puzzle. The idea was to 
get a better understanding of the influence of the IPO offer price on the level of underpricing.   
 
The main research question of this research is: Does variation in the absolute and relative 
value of the IPO offer price explain variation in underpricing in the Europe?  
 
This paragraph will provide an answer to the research sub questions and an answer to the 
main research question followed by an answer to the question whether or not the null 
hypothesis can be rejected. 
 
Sub question 1: What is an IPO? 
IPO is the abbreviation of "initial public offering": the first sale of shares of a private 
company to the public. This process is often referred to as "going public", resulting in the 
shares of the issuing company being quoted at one or more stock exchanges. Among the main 
reasons to place an IPO is the wish to raise equity capital for the company; being listed on a 
stock exchange facilitates the possibility for the company to make stock-financed 
acquisitions. Furthermore, an important reason for listing the company in the stock market is 
to create the possibility for shareholders to convert part of their wealth into cash.  
The large variation in the number of IPOs in time seems to suggest that valuations in the 
market are the main factor in the choice when to go public. 
 
Sub question 2: What is IPO underpricing? 
IPO underpricing is formally the percentage difference between the closing price of the stock 
after the first day of trading and the final offer price. Underpricing has been the subject of 
extensive academic research, likely due to its persistent nature over the last 55 years 
internationally across countries with very different company populations, corporate control 
mechanisms, and institutional, legal, taxation, regulatory, historical, and cultural frameworks. 
While cyclical, underpricing may have increased in magnitude over time.  
 
Sub question 3: Which theories explaining underpricing can be distinguished in scientific 
literature? 
Various theories that partially try to explain underpricing can be distinguished. The broad 
categories that I've discussed are: theories that focus on asymmetric information, principle-
agent models, theories that focus on institutional reasons, and behavioral approaches. These 
broader categories of theories all contain various explanations and models that suggest 
potential causes for underpricing. There seems to be no single main theoretical cause for 
underpricing; it is more a matter of the relative importance of various models than a matter of 
which model is absolutely right. One reason can be important for certain firms at certain 
times, and the models are commonly not mutually exclusive (Ritter et al., 2002). Hence, it 
remains an open question which of these theories holds up strongly in reality. 
 
Sub question 4: What reasons are given within scientific literature for differences, or the lack 
thereof, in the absolute value of individual shares? 
In frictionless and efficient markets, there is no optimal per-share stock price (Baker et al., 
2012). However, share price and IPO offer price history indicate the existence of seemingly 
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optimal price ranges. Stock splits and reverse stock splits are the cause of fairly constant 
average nominal share prices over the last 80 years. While there are various hypotheses trying 
to explain the fact that average nominal share prices are relatively stable, Weld et al. (2009) 
found that popular explanations cannot account for this phenomenon: after ruling out the 
explanations typically given Weld et al. (2009) conclude that convention is the most likely 
explanation, suggesting that conforming to geographical standards and norms is the main 
reason for the lack of variation in price levels.  
While norms seem to be the cause of lack of variation in the absolute value of individual 
shares within single currency unions, differences in norms geographically seem to account 
for the differences in the average absolute value of shares across various single currency 
unions: the average IPO offer price in the Euro single currency union is significantly higher 
than the average IPO offer price in the GBP single currency union at the 0,01 level. 
 
Sub question 5: Does IPO underpricing depend on the offer price level? 
Main research question: Does variation in the absolute and relative value of the IPO offer 
price explain variation in underpricing in Europe? 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to establish whether or not underpricing could be partially 
explained by variation in IPO offer prices. Fernando et al. (2004) found a U-shaped relation 
between underpricing and IPO offer price levels: both low-priced IPOs and high-priced IPOs 
in the U.S. are more underpriced.  
Based on a sample of 1056 IPOs in British Pounds and a sample of 510 IPOs in Euros, 
starting in 1992 and 2001 respectively, the researcher finds that the results found by Fernando 
et al. (2004) do not hold within these currency unions.  
 
However, this thesis finds strong evidence that lower IPO prices in the GBP single currency 
union are related to higher underpricing, supporting the results found by Bradley et al. (2006) 
and Fernando et al. (2004) for lower-priced IPOs, and marginal evidence that higher IPO 
prices in the Euro single currency union are related to higher underpricing, suggesting there is 
marginal support for the results found by Fernando et al. (2004) for higher-priced IPOs.  
 
In the regression analysis of the GBP sample of table 14 the independent variable Price range 
1 is statistically significant at the p < 0,01 level in all models. Moreover, in models 1, 2, and 
3 the regression coefficient for the independent variable Price range 2 is statistically 
significant at the p < 0,01 level. Thus, according to all models, firms that have offer prices 
belonging to quintile 1 have, on average, a significantly higher underpricing compared to 
firms that belong to quintile 0 (median range of offer prices), and according to models 1, 2, 
and 3, firms that have offer prices belonging to quintile 2 have, on average, a significantly 
higher underpricing compared to firms that belong to quintile 0. The higher underpricing in 
quintile 1 is in the range of 10,63 to 14,32 percent; the higher underpricing in quintile 2 is in 
the range of 4,81 to 6,60 percent. 
In the regression analysis of the Euro sample of table 12 the independent variable Price range 
4 is statistically significant at the p < 0,05 level in models 4 and 5, but not in models 1, 2, and 
3. Thus, according to models 4 and 5, firms that have offer prices belonging to quintile 4 
have, on average, a significantly higher underpricing compared to firms that belong to 
quintile 0 (median range of offer prices). The higher underpricing is in the range of 4,19 to 
5,82 percent. 
 
The independent variable price range explains 17,1% of the variance in the dependent 
variable underpricing in the GBP sample (model 1 in table 14). Moreover, the addition of 
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price range dummies to the existing model 1 in table 15 of the regression analysis of the GBP 
sample causes an improvement in the explanatory power: the degree of goodness of fit of the 
regression model - measured by Adj. R² - increases by 7,1% - from 11,8% to 18,9%.  
The outcome of the regression analysis of the Euro sample is that the independent variables 
price range explains virtually none of the variance in the dependent variable underpricing. 
Fernando et al. (2004) found an adjusted R² of 3,3% in similar models. 
 
It seems fair to suggest that differences in geographical norms are the main cause of variation 
in the average offer prices of the two samples. Average offer prices in British pounds are 
significantly lower than average offer prices in Euros at the p < 0,01 level. Hence, the offer 
price in nominal terms seems to be fairly irrelevant: only roughly 10% of the GBP sample 
would not fall into the lowest price range of the Euro sample when converted at an exchange 
rate of 1,5.  
 
H0: There is no association between the magnitude of underpricing and the level of the IPO 
offer price. 
Based on the answer to the main research question the null hypothesis can be rejected.  
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
Reliability of data  
The data were obtained from of the ThomsonReuters Eikon database: The researcher has had 
virtual access to these secondary data. In general data from large, well-known organisations 
are likely to be reliable and trustworthy, as the continued existence of such organizations is 
dependent on the credibility of their data: this is referred to as assessing the authority or 
reputation of the source (Saunders et al., 2016). Consequently, the procedures used by 
ThomsonReuters for collecting and compiling the data are likely to be well thought through 
and accurate, and the researcher assumes the likelihood of potential biases and errors to be 
small. The researcher considers the data to be of high quality and feels that the data are 
reliable and credible, and representative of the population. The researcher considers the data 
to be conforming to external reliability: replication of the research design would produce 
consistent findings, and internal reliability: the researcher holds that during the research 
project consistency has been ensured. 
 
Validity of method  
Validity refers to the appropriateness of the measures used, accuracy of the analysis of the 
results and generalizability of the findings.  
According to the researcher the measures being used in the research to assess underpricing 
are the appropriate for their intended purpose - they actually measure what they are intended 
to. This is referred to as measurement validity. 
In one of the two samples - the GBP sample - a strong causal relationship between price 
ranges and underpricing has been demonstrated, meaning that internal validity has been 
established.  
The researcher expects that the research findings can be generalized to other relevant settings 
within their respective currency unions: this implies external validity.  
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Results  
The research project met the aim of answering the research questions for both samples 
individually, and the research project met the research objectives of establishing a 
relationship between IPO underpricing and offer price ranges.  
 
For the GBP sample, the main findings of the research are that the independent variable Price 
range 1 is statistically significant at the p < 0,01 level in all models, and that the independent 
variable Price range 2 is statistically significant at the p < 0,01 level in models 1, 2, and 3. 
The adjusted R² for model 1 in table 14 of the GBP sample - the model that regresses 
underpricing and price range - has a value of 17,1%. Compared to the initial models of 
Bradley et al. (2006) who found an adjusted R² of 0.55% in their initial regression and 
Fernando et al. (2004) who found an adjusted R² of 3,3% in their initial regression, the results 
of the GBP regression equation suggest that there is a relatively strong relationship between 
underpricing and price range within the GBP single currency union.  
Furthermore the incremental explanatory power of adding the price ranges to the regression 
in the GBP sample improves the explanatory power of the model by 7,1% - measured by the 
difference in Adj. R² between models 1 and 2 of table 15.  
 
For the Euro sample, the main findings of the research are that the independent variable Price 
range 4 is statistically significant at the p < 0,05 level in models 4 and 5, but not in models 1, 
2, and 3. 
The adjusted R² for model 1 in table 14 of the Euro sample - the model that regresses 
underpricing and price range - has a value of -0,004%.  
 
The outcomes suggest that investors can, on average, make higher first-day returns when the 
invest in lower priced IPOs in the Pound single currency area, and issuers in that same area 
will, on average, face lower underpricing when they decide to issue their stock at offer prices 
above the two lowest quintiles.  
 
Limitations 
The main disadvantage of using secondary data is that there are limitations in the amount of 
observations of control variables; while data were available for all the variables required to 
answer the research questions, the data for control variables were not always available, hence 
the number of observations in the models 4 and 5 of tables 12 and 14 vary from each other 
and from the other models in their tables. Therefore it is hard to establish whether the results 
found in these models are the consequence of the addition of the control variables, the 
consequence of a change in sample size or a combination of both.  
Ideally these data of control variables LN assets and debt/assets would have been available 
for all observations, in which case a more profound statement could have been made about 
the strength of the relationships found.   
The same could be said about variables commonly used in IPO literature that are seen as 
partial causes of underpricing, for instance revision in the offer price, underwriter reputation 
and venture capital backing.  
 
5.3 Recommendations 
 
This research finds that differences exist between currency unions in the way in which 
variance in IPO price levels is associated with variance in underpricing. Further research 
within other countries or single currency unions where larger numbers of IPOs have been 
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placed could help establish whether the relationship found in the GBP single currency area 
can be found elsewhere as well, or whether in other geographical areas limited relationship 
will be found, just as in the Euro single currency area. 
 
Another recommendation is to overcome the limitations of this research.  
Missing data of firm-specific information could be obtained either by acquiring access to 
other data vendors or through the specific firms individually by looking into their 
prospectuses. Acquisition of these data should lead to a better insight into the relationship 
between IPO offer price and underpricing, as the same number of observations would be used 
in all models. Adding other control variables - a number are mentioned in the previous 
paragraph - should lead to further development of knowledge of underpricing and its causes. 
 
Further recommendations focus on trying to find potential causes for the results found in this 
study.  
Differences in types of post-IPO shareholders could be a potential cause for variance in 
underpricing. Internet brokers might be able to provide data that could lead to further 
exploration of shareholder dispersion and partial causes of underpricing: average order size 
could be a starting point. This could potentially provide an insight into causes of the 
differences in underpricing variation found in this thesis - as a result of varying preferences 
of institutional investors. If the results found by Alves et al. (2014) - institutional investors 
that are located in countries within the Euro single currency union have a preference for 
stocks with higher prices while institutional investors that are located in European countries 
outside of the Euro single currency union tend to avoid stocks with higher prices - are not 
caused by conversion into another currency, this suggests that institutional investors in 
European countries outside of the Euro single currency union could be rewarded for revealing 
their information about the value of an IPO by higher underpricing. This would mean that the 
model by Benveniste et al. (1989) would hold for both the lower priced IPOs in the GBP 
single currency union and to a lesser extent for higher priced IPOs in the Euro single 
currency union.  
 
Chambers et al. (2009) suggest that an increase in underpricing over time found in the U.K. 
could be caused by a reduced level of trust. It is possible that lower-priced IPOs experience a 
lower level of trust than other IPOs. Bradley et al. (2006) found that underwriters with a low 
reputation in the U.S. accounted for 26% of penny stock IPOs and 4% of ordinary IPOs: 
penny stock IPOs led by low reputation underwriters were significantly more underpriced 
than ordinary IPOs. Possibly a similar relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing could be found in the U.K.: Roosenboom (2012) found that in France 
underwriters with a higher reputation value issues more accurately.  
 
Another recommendation is to examine investor psychology of share price levels: according 
to Birru et al. (2014) investors suffer from a nominal price illusion, overestimating the room 
to grow for low priced stocks. Considering the fact that the average share price (and IPO 
offer price) in the GBP single currency union is much lower than the average share (and IPO 
offer) price in the Euro single currency union - the lowest offer price in the GBP single 
currency union was 0,01 Pound -, and the fact that lower priced IPOs are significantly more 
underpriced, the nominal price illusion could be contributing to these higher initial returns.  
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Appendix  
 
Assumption checks for the Euro sample, table 12, model 3.  
 
Autocorrelation: The Durbin-Watson statistic of 2 means that there is no autocorrelation in 
the sample. The Durbin-Watson statistic can take on any value between 0 and 4.  
 
Table 16 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 0,305
a
 0,093 0,009 12,2910 1,918 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UKDummy, 2007, CyprusDummy, IrelandDummy, 
PortugalDummy, 2001, LuxembDummy, AustriaDummy, SwitzerlandDummy, 
FinlandDummy, CzechDummy, SpainDummy, 2009, NetherlandsDummy, 
ConsumerDiscretDummy, EnergyDummy, MaterialsDummy, 2013, 2010, BelgiumDummy, 
Range3Dummy, ConsumerStapleDummy, 2012, 2002, 2015, UtilDummy, 2011, 
ItalyDummy, 2003, RealEstDummy, 2004, 2008, GermanyDummy, TechDummy, 2005, 
Range2Dummy, 2014, FinanceDummy, Range4Dummy, HealthCDummy, LN_Proceeds, 
GreeceDummy, Range1Dummy 
b. Dependent Variable: Underpricing_% 
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Normal distribution of residuals: The assumption is that the residuals are random, normally 
distributed variables with 0 mean, and no more than 4 standard deviations away from the 
mean. Both the histogram (figure 3) and the P/P plot (figure 4) show that the sample 
approaches the normal distribution.  
 
 
Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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Homoscedasticity concerns the degree to which the residuals of the dependent and the 
independent variables have the same variance. The error term should be the same across all 
the values of the independent variable.  
 
Figure 5 
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Linearity concerns the extent to which the dependent variable is linearly related to one or 
more predictors, or independent variables. Since LN Proceeds is the only continuous variable 
of model 3, table 12, the partial regression plot between underpricing and LN Proceeds is 
used.  
 
Figure 6 
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Collinearity concerns the degree to which two or more predictors are correlated to each other; independent variables should not be closely 
linearly related. In order to check for collinearity, the VIF score should be lower than 5 and the tolerance should not be lower than 0,2 (which is 
the same since tolerance = 1/VIF).  
 
Table 17 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 5,982 2,125  2,815 0,005   
Range1Dummy 0,432 2,060 0,014 0,210 0,834 0,453 2,207 
Range2Dummy 0,779 1,833 0,025 0,425 0,671 0,547 1,828 
Range3Dummy 0,633 1,807 0,021 0,350 0,726 0,563 1,776 
Range4Dummy 2,795 1,902 0,091 1,470 0,142 0,508 1,968 
LN_Proceeds -0,638 0,292 -0,129 -2,186 0,029 0,555 1,801 
2001 -7,518 9,526 -0,038 -0,789 0,430 0,836 1,197 
2002 -5,917 4,683 -0,067 -1,263 0,207 0,703 1,423 
2003 4,501 4,403 0,058 1,022 0,307 0,615 1,626 
2004 -2,527 2,341 -0,055 -1,079 0,281 0,748 1,338 
2005 -2,574 2,184 -0,060 -1,179 0,239 0,757 1,321 
2007 -0,785 1,627 -0,027 -0,482 0,630 0,605 1,653 
2008 -0,835 3,571 -0,012 -0,234 0,815 0,765 1,308 
2009 -0,932 4,615 -0,009 -0,202 0,840 0,901 1,110 
2010 -8,863 3,543 -0,117 -2,502 0,013 0,884 1,131 
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2011 0,545 2,997 0,009 0,182 0,856 0,835 1,197 
2012 -1,509 3,594 -0,020 -0,420 0,675 0,859 1,164 
2013 0,636 3,187 0,010 0,199 0,842 0,857 1,167 
2014 -3,251 2,397 -0,069 -1,356 0,176 0,748 1,338 
2015 0,627 3,036 0,010 0,207 0,836 0,814 1,229 
FinanceDummy -0,948 2,382 -0,022 -0,398 0,691 0,636 1,572 
EnergyDummy 1,768 3,843 0,022 0,460 0,646 0,873 1,146 
ConsumerStapleDummy 1,775 2,597 0,034 0,684 0,495 0,769 1,300 
ConsumerDiscretDummy 2,416 1,975 0,067 1,223 0,222 0,649 1,540 
HealthCDummy -0,368 1,983 -0,011 -0,186 0,853 0,594 1,683 
MaterialsDummy -0,515 2,785 -0,009 -0,185 0,853 0,819 1,221 
RealEstDummy -3,864 2,536 -0,078 -1,524 0,128 0,740 1,351 
TechDummy -0,568 1,795 -0,018 -0,316 0,752 0,616 1,622 
UtilDummy -4,429 3,542 -0,061 -1,250 0,212 0,827 1,209 
AustriaDummy 4,462 3,740 0,057 1,193 0,233 0,853 1,173 
BelgiumDummy 4,324 2,207 0,095 1,959 0,051 0,822 1,216 
CyprusDummy 0,811 12,692 0,003 0,064 0,949 0,940 1,064 
CzechDummy 24,120 12,457 0,087 1,936 0,053 0,975 1,025 
FinlandDummy 0,298 3,995 0,004 0,074 0,941 0,880 1,137 
GermanyDummy 2,486 1,737 0,073 1,431 0,153 0,750 1,334 
GreeceDummy 0,747 3,546 0,014 0,211 0,833 0,470 2,128 
ItalyDummy 5,309 2,414 0,127 2,199 0,028 0,585 1,708 
LuxembDummy 2,133 4,888 0,020 0,436 0,663 0,916 1,092 
NetherlandsDummy 2,855 3,262 0,042 0,875 0,382 0,864 1,158 
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PortugalDummy -0,872 9,291 -0,004 -0,094 0,925 0,878 1,138 
IrelandDummy 7,547 4,163 0,093 1,813 0,071 0,744 1,345 
SpainDummy 3,679 3,760 0,047 0,978 0,328 0,844 1,185 
SwitzerlandDummy -7,669 6,519 -0,055 -1,176 0,240 0,896 1,116 
UKDummy 0,989 3,413 0,015 0,290 0,772 0,709 1,411 
a. Dependent Variable: Underpricing_% 
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Assumption checks for the GBP sample, table 14, model 3.  
 
Autocorrelation: The Durbin-Watson statistic of 2 means that there is no autocorrelation in 
the sample. The Durbin-Watson statistic can take on any value between 0 and 4.  
 
Table 18 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 0,465
a
 0,216 0,189 11,9053 1,932 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UtilitiesDummy, LN_Proceeds, 1992, 1997, 1994, 1993, 2012, 
1996, 2008, 1998, ConsumerStapleDummy, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2015, 2011, 2002, 2009, 
EnergyDummy, 2010, RealEstateDummy, Consumer Discretionary, 2013, 2003, 
HealthCareDummy, 1,7465-2,7655, 2007, MaterialsDummy, 2014, 0,3805-1,13, 
TechnologyDummy, 2005, IndustrialsDummy, 2006, 2,7655-42, 0-0,3805 
b. Dependent Variable: Underpricing_% 
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Normal distribution of residuals: The assumption is that the residuals are random, normally 
distributed variables with 0 mean, and no more than 4 standard deviations away from the 
mean. Both the histogram (figure 7) and the P/P plot (figure 8) show that the sample 
approaches the normal distribution.  
 
Figure 7 
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Figure 8 
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Homoscedasticity concerns the degree to which the residuals of the dependent and the 
independent variables have the same variance. The error term should be the same across all 
the values of the independent variable.  
 
Figure 9  
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Linearity concerns the extent to which the dependent variable is linearly related to one or 
more predictors, or independent variables. Since LN Proceeds is the only continuous variable 
of model 3, table 12, the partial regression plot between underpricing and LN Proceeds is 
used.  
 
Figure 10  
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Collinearity concerns the degree to which two or more predictors are correlated to each other; independent variables should not be closely 
linearly related. In order to check for collinearity, the VIF score should be lower than 5 and the tolerance should not be lower than 0,2.  
 
Table 19 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 11,664 1,698  6,871 0,000   
0-0,3805 12,118 1,388 0,352 8,729 0,000 0,472 2,119 
0,3805-1,13 4,806 1,261 0,146 3,812 0,000 0,526 1,900 
1,7465-2,7655 -0,117 1,196 -0,004 -0,098 0,922 0,571 1,752 
2,7655-42 -0,072 1,272 -0,002 -0,056 0,955 0,506 1,974 
LN_Proceeds -0,631 0,279 -0,094 -2,259 0,024 0,440 2,271 
1992 -4,903 12,046 -0,011 -0,407 0,684 0,978 1,023 
1993 11,035 8,533 0,036 1,293 0,196 0,975 1,026 
1994 -2,846 11,999 -0,007 -0,237 0,813 0,985 1,015 
1996 20,628 8,534 0,068 2,417 0,016 0,975 1,026 
1997 -7,022 4,619 -0,043 -1,520 0,129 0,956 1,047 
1998 0,391 12,006 0,001 0,033 0,974 0,984 1,016 
1999 5,138 6,971 0,021 0,737 0,461 0,975 1,026 
2000 -12,154 3,741 -0,093 -3,249 0,001 0,930 1,075 
2001 -2,310 2,910 -0,023 -0,794 0,427 0,897 1,114 
2002 -9,866 2,576 -0,114 -3,830 0,000 0,875 1,143 
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2003 -1,560 1,846 -0,026 -0,845 0,398 0,784 1,276 
2005 0,313 1,311 0,008 0,239 0,811 0,634 1,577 
2006 -1,188 1,312 -0,032 -0,906 0,365 0,616 1,622 
2007 -1,673 1,442 -0,039 -1,160 0,246 0,666 1,503 
2008 -4,035 2,715 -0,044 -1,486 0,138 0,892 1,121 
2009 -6,830 5,499 -0,035 -1,242 0,215 0,942 1,062 
2010 -4,692 2,140 -0,067 -2,192 0,029 0,824 1,214 
2011 -2,838 2,195 -0,040 -1,293 0,196 0,824 1,213 
2012 -2,947 2,444 -0,036 -1,206 0,228 0,871 1,148 
2013 -1,280 1,804 -0,023 -0,710 0,478 0,747 1,339 
2014 -2,961 1,583 -0,062 -1,871 0,062 0,694 1,441 
2015 -2,363 2,236 -0,032 -1,057 0,291 0,838 1,194 
Consumer Discretionary -0,419 1,355 -0,010 -0,309 0,757 0,721 1,388 
ConsumerStapleDummy -0,937 1,936 -0,014 -0,484 0,628 0,860 1,163 
EnergyDummy 0,306 1,699 0,006 0,180 0,857 0,817 1,224 
HealthCareDummy 0,894 1,598 0,018 0,559 0,576 0,777 1,287 
IndustrialsDummy 1,133 1,217 0,032 0,931 0,352 0,662 1,511 
MaterialsDummy -0,480 1,421 -0,011 -0,338 0,736 0,730 1,371 
RealEstateDummy -0,958 2,009 -0,014 -0,477 0,633 0,871 1,148 
TechnologyDummy 0,781 1,261 0,021 0,619 0,536 0,663 1,508 
UtilitiesDummy 2,841 3,586 0,023 0,792 0,428 0,929 1,077 
 
